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1. Introduction 1 
 2 
One of the main challenges facing EU agriculture and its common policy post 2020, is to foster the 3 
adoption of environment-friendly agricultural practices and sustainable land management (European 4 
Commission 2017). To do this, consideration should be given to how to motivate farmers to better 5 
manage the environment in an effective and efficient way. 6 
There are multiple barriers to the adoption of environment friendly farming practices.  First, a farmer 7 
may be reluctant to bear individually the costs of their implementation, since the benefits created will 8 
be distributed collectively. For example, the maintenance of hedgerows promotes pollination 9 
services or natural regulation by crop auxiliaries in neighbouring farms. To overcome this public 10 
good dilemma, incentive schemes have been set up in the EU since the late nineties with the aim of 11 
encouraging farmers to adopt practices beneficial for the environment under multiannual contracts. 12 
These so-called agri-environmental measures are designed to compensate for the costs faced by 13 
farmers when they implement such practices1.  14 
Second, adopting environment-friendly practices sometimes leads to greater variability in yields and 15 
costs (Knapp and Heijden 2018) not easily accepted by risk-averse farmers (Binswanger 1980; 16 
Chavas and Holt 1996; Bocquého, Jacquet and Reynaud 2014; Bougherara et al. 2017; Menapace, 17 
Colson and Raffaelli 2013; Chèze, David and Martinet 2020). Farmers may choose to avoid the 18 
foreground risk of profit variability arising from risk-increasing environment-friendly practices by 19 
not engaging in them. 20 
In addition, farmers also face risks beyond their control. Agriculture is one of the economic sectors 21 
most exposed to exogenous risks (hereinafter referred to as “background risks”) such as climate 22 
change (or climate hazards more generally) (Herberich and List 2012). While farmers can use 23 
various strategies to manage the consequences of climate risks on production (e.g. irrigation, resilient 24 
crops) and/or revenues (e.g. income diversification, insurance), these strategies do not always allow 25 
for all risks to be pooled or shifted (OECD 2009). Part of the risk inevitably remains in the 26 
background. As a result, farmers must decide whether they should adopt potentially risk-increasing 27 
practices in an already uncertain environment. In other words, they have to decide whether to bear 28 
the foreground (endogenous) risks while simultaneously facing one or more immutable background 29 
(exogenous) risks. Taking into account the background risk could thus significantly improve our 30 
understanding of behaviours in many contexts, including the decision to adopt risky and 31 
                                                 
1 While, in theory, agri-environmental measures aim at compensating the total costs of implementing environment-
friendly practices, it is not always the case in practice. First, because it provides a fixed payment to farmers, calculated on 
the average costs in a given region. As a result, some farmers, facing higher costs, have no incentive to contract such 
measures. Second, because additional costs, such as transaction or learning costs, are not always accounted for in the 
design of the payments. This increases the total costs for farmers, who, in turns, have no incentive to engage in such 
contracts (Ducos, Dupraz and Bonnieux 2009; Espinosa-Goded, Barreiro-Hurlé and Dupraz 2013). While this is an 
important barrier to agri-environmental measures adoption, this is not the main focus of our paper. Here, we only 
consider payments that cover the full costs of implementation. 
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environment-friendly practices. In this multiple risks context, it is well known that the optimal risk-1 
taking decision on a particular risk is generally not independent of the existence of other risks, even 2 
if these risks are independent (Gollier 2001). Whether agents make more or less risky decisions when 3 
the riskiness of the environment itself changes depends on assumptions about preferences (Gollier 4 
and Pratt (1996), Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996), Diamond (1984), Quiggin (2003)). 5 
Therefore, understanding the effect of background risk on risk-taking behaviours remains an 6 
empirical question.2 7 
While agri-environmental measures aim to offset the full costs of environment-friendly practices 8 
implementation, their design does not take these two types of risks (foreground and background risk) 9 
into account. Therefore, even with these measures, farmers could still refrain from adopting such 10 
practices in order to avoid the variability of profits associated with them in an already uncertain 11 
context.  12 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we analyse the importance of background risk on 13 
decisions to adopt environmentally sound practices (whether risky or not) in a context of strategic 14 
uncertainty. Second, we assess how incentive payments, similar to those proposed under the CAP to 15 
promote sustainable agriculture, are effective in triggering the adoption of environment-friendly 16 
practices in the presence of foreground and/or background risk. 17 
To do so, we begin by developing a simple theoretical model to study how farmers allocate their land 18 
between environment-friendly and conventional practices (a portfolio decision) and how this 19 
decision is influenced by the presence of foreground and background risks, as well as a certain 20 
incentive payment. In our framework, a producer's individual gain depends both on his or her own 21 
contribution to environment-friendly farming and on the total area cultivated with such green 22 
practices in the group. These practices are assumed to be more costly and riskier than conventional 23 
practices. The marginal return from agriculture is uncertain, regardless of the practices used, due to 24 
production, price and policy uncertainties, and this constitutes the background risk. To simplify, we 25 
assume that preferences over the random ex-post wealth can be represented by a two-moment utility 26 
function (Meyer, 1987). We prove that, under DARA preferences, the game between farmers is with 27 
strategic complementarities. As a consequence, there is potentially too little land cultivated with 28 
environment-friendly practices compared to the situation where farmers cooperate perfectly. In 29 
addition, among other results, we show three main findings: (i) the presence of foreground risk 30 
reduces the adoption of environment-friendly practices, (ii) the presence of background risk reduces 31 
                                                 
2 Laboratory and field experiments have been designed to test whether background risk affects the risk behavior of 
individuals. Laboratory experiments conducted by Lusk and Coble (2008), Lee (2008) and Beaud and Willinger (2014) 
concluded that an individual exposed to background risk (whether fair or unfair) would be willing to take fewer 
foreground risk. With regards to field experiments, Harrison et al. (2007) find that increasing background risk increases 
risk aversion in the U.S. rare coins market. In contrast, Bchir and Willinger (2013) found that Peruvians living in high-
risk areas (due to volcano mudflows) are less risk-averse than those living with lower background risk levels, but their 
result holds only for low income individuals (no significant results for higher incomes). Herberich and List (2012) carried 
out an experiment similar to that of Harrison et al. (2007) comparing US farmers and students, but they find no 
conclusive results regarding the impact of background risk on risk aversion. 
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the adoption of green farming practices but only when they are risky and (iii) the incentive payment 1 
increases the adoption of green farming practices in all risks contexts. 2 
In a second step, we conducted a framed lab experiment based on a public good game in order to test 3 
the empirical validity of the three results described above. The experiment is contextualized to 4 
capture the context of European agriculture and the subject pool consists of future agriculture 5 
stakeholders (students in agriculture). We observe that adopting green farming practices is indeed 6 
less likely when they are risky (as in (i)). We also find that background risk can reduce the 7 
willingness to engage in environment-friendly practices with public good properties, but even if there 8 
are not risk-increasing (as opposed to the theoretical result (ii)). Moreover, we highlight that a given 9 
incentive payment can efficiently increase the adoption of green practices when only one source of 10 
risk exists but can fail to do so in the presence of both foreground and background risks (therefore 11 
qualifying result (iii)). 12 
Our analysis adds to the sparse literature investigating the production decisions of risk-averse 13 
farmers in the presence of multiple risks (Coyle 1999; Isik 2002; Serra et al. 2006; Ridier, Chaib and 14 
Roussy 2016; Bontems and Nauges 2019).3 In particular, we contribute to the literature by analysing 15 
the influence of background risk on cooperative decisions, in a context of strategic uncertainty. Most 16 
of the literature on background risk is in the field of finance and focuses on its impact on individual 17 
portfolio decisions. In strategic context, only the impact of foreground risk has been analysed, in 18 
particular in the experimental literature applied to environmental issues based on public good games 19 
(Dickinson 1998; Gangadharan and Nemes 2009; Levati, Morone and Fiore 2009; Levati and 20 
Morone 2013). We contribute to the literature by testing whether the presence of background risk 21 
reduces the voluntary contribution to a public good (with and without foreground risk). 22 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the modelling framework, section 3 the 23 
experimental design, and section 4 the experimental results. In section 5, we discuss the policy 24 
implications and limitations of the study while section 6 concludes. 25 
 26 
                                                 
3 There are many different risk taxonomies in the agricultural economics literature (see OECD (2009) for a review of the 
different classifications of agricultural risks). For example, one can distinguish between output and price uncertainty, 
sometimes including other sources such as technological or policy uncertainty (Moschini and Hennessy 2001). Another 
useful categorization in dynamic context is that of « non-embedded risks », i.e. risks that are beyond control of the 
decision maker because all decisions are made initially, versus « embedded risks », i.e. risks that can be influenced by 
farmers’ adaptive behaviour due to sequential decisions (Hardaker, Pandey and Patten 1991; Dorward 1999; Ridier, 
Chaib and Roussy 2016). While both taxonomies are certainly relevant, we rely here on another one to distinguish 
between background risk (which is beyond farmers’ control and affects all crops) and foreground risk (which only affects 
crops grown according to environment-friendly practices: Farmers may therefore choose to avoid the foreground risk by 
not engaging in such practices). 
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2. The modelling framework 1 
2.1 The farmer’s problem 2 
Each farmer disposes of 𝐿௜ hectares (exogenous endowment, equal for all players) and has to decide 3 
how much of this land is farmed with environment-friendly practices (𝑔௜ ≤ 𝐿௜  hectares) or with 4 
conventional ones (𝐿௜ − 𝑔௜ hectares). Since green farming benefits the group (through ecosystem 5 
services), the individual’s payoff depends both on her/his own contribution to green farming (𝑔௜) and 6 
on the total area farmed with green practices in the group (∑ 𝑔௜௡௜ୀଵ ).  7 
The net private benefits of agriculture depends on the financial returns (𝑏𝐿௜), minus the costs 8 
multiplied by the number of hectares cultivated with each type of practice. The financial returns per 9 
hectare b include the price, the yield and the base CAP payment (first pillar), and are assumed to be 10 
the same for both types of practices.4 Environment-friendly practices are assumed to be on average 11 
more expensive than conventional practices (𝑐௚ > 𝑐௖), as alternative management strategies can be 12 
more labour-intensive and generate learning costs5.  13 
To account for the public good nature of the services provided by the adoption of environment-14 
friendly practices, our game is similar to a public good game: when one unit of land is environment-15 
friendly farmed,  𝛽(𝑔௜ + 𝛿𝑔ି௜ )  points are earned by a farmer in the neighbourhood, where 𝑔ି௜ =16 
∑ 𝑔௝௝ஷ௜  is the sum of other farmers’ actions. The parameter 𝛽 > 0 is the green land efficiency factor, 17 
corresponding to the ecosystem services associated with green practices. The parameter 𝛿 ≥ 0 is a 18 
scaling factor allowing for a differentiated efficiency of personal green land and others’ green land. 19 
In the limit case where 𝛿 = 0, each farmer does not benefit from the actions of others: there is no 20 
strategic uncertainty. 21 
The adoption of environment-friendly practices can be supported by an incentive payment scheme: 22 
PAY per hectare. The agri-environmental schemes of the rural development policy and the green 23 
payment of the first pillar of the CAP can be seen as two examples of instruments that are 24 
conditional on the respect of certain environmental standards or practices.  25 
Overall, the payoff function of farmer 𝑖 is defined as 26 
𝜋௜ = 𝑏𝐿௜ − 𝑐௖(𝐿௜ − 𝑔௜) − 𝑐௚𝑔௜ + 𝛽(𝑔௜ + 𝛿𝑔ି௜) + 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑔௜ 27 
It is convenient to rewrite this expression as follows: 28 
𝜋௜ = 𝜀𝐿௜ + 𝑎𝑔௜ + 𝛽𝛿𝑔ି௜ 29 
                                                 
4 Indeed, most environmentally friendly practices do not provide access to different prices for the products since they 
cannot be labelled or certified or are not well-known by the consumers (Bazoche et al. 2013). Moreover, there is no 
consensus on the impact of environment-friendly practices on yields and yields variability, notably because yield level 
has many determinants interacting with each other (Lechenet et al. 2017). Finally, CAP direct payments are paid 
whatever the choice of practices made by a farmer (as long as the land is maintained in good agricultural and 
environmental conditions and the three greening requirements are fulfilled). 
5 For example, integrated pest management strategies, such as those based on crop diversification and rotations, are time 
and information/knowledge intensive, compared to pesticide-based pest management strategy as used in conventional 
agriculture (Guillou et al. 2013; Lefebvre et al. 2017). 
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where 𝜀 = 𝑏 − 𝑐௖ and 𝑎 = 𝑃𝐴𝑌 − (𝑐௚ − 𝑐௖ − 𝛽). 1 
The payoff is decomposed into a term 𝜀𝐿௜ proportional to the size of land devoted to farming, a term 2 
𝑎𝑔௜ proportional to the land devoted to environment-friendly farming, and finally a term 𝛽𝛿𝑔ି௜ 3 
proportional to the land devoted to environmentfriendly farming by neighboring farmers.6  4 
The parameter 𝜀 is the marginal net benefit of farming which is expressed as the difference between 5 
the marginal benefit of farming 𝑏 and the marginal cost 𝑐௖ of using conventional practices. The 6 
parameter 𝑎 is the additional marginal net benefit of farming that the farmer can obtain by using 7 
environment-friendly practices instead of conventional ones. It is expressed as the difference 8 
between the incentive payment 𝑃𝐴𝑌 and the opportunity cost of 𝑔௜ which is 𝑐௚ − 𝑐௖ − 𝛽. Indeed, the 9 
alternative to green farming is to use conventional practices which allows to save some costs 𝑐௚ −10 
𝑐௖ > 0 but entails the loss of not enjoying 𝛽 per unit of land. 11 
2.2 Modelling foreground and background risks 12 
There are two sources of risk, together with the presence of strategic uncertainty due to the public 13 
good nature of the game.  14 
First, to account for risks beyond farmers’ control, we assume that the marginal benefit 𝑏 is random 15 
with mean 𝑏 and variance 𝑣௕. It follows that 𝜀 is random with mean 𝜀 = 𝑏 − 𝑐௖ and variance 𝑣ఌ =16 
𝑣௕.  We assume that the parameters are such that 𝜀 > 0. As a consequence, the payoff component 17 
𝜀𝐿௜ constitutes a background risk, affecting all the farmland independently from agricultural 18 
practices, capturing production uncertainty on yields (for example due to climate hazards), but also 19 
price uncertainty and policy uncertainty regarding the size of base CAP payments. 20 
Second, environment-friendly practices entail additional risk due to the cost 𝑐௚ which is random with 21 
mean 𝑐௚ and variance 𝑣௚. It follows that 𝑎 is random with mean 𝑎 = 𝑐௖ − 𝑐௚ + 𝛽 + 𝑃𝐴𝑌 and 22 
variance 𝑣௔ = 𝑣௚. Under uncertainty with respect to 𝑐௚, the payoff component 𝑎𝑔௜ represents the 23 
foreground risk.  24 
There is potential correlation between the cost of environment-friendly practices 𝑐௚ and the benefit 𝑏, 25 
which translates into a covariance between the background risk 𝜀 and the foreground risk 𝑎 that we 26 
denote 𝜎௔ఌ. This correlation is positive if the cost of environment-friendly practices implementation 27 
depends on those same climatic events that influence yields or prices. It is null if the obstacles to 28 
environment-friendly farming (translated into higher costs) are specific to such practices. At this 29 
stage, we do not impose specific assumptions on the sign of this correlation in order to fit various 30 
settings. 31 
The farmer’s decision about how much land should be devoted to farming employing environment-32 
friendly practices can thus be seen as a portfolio decision for an agent owning an initial and certain 33 
                                                 
6 The game therefore corresponds to an impure public good game because contributions to the public good generate 
collective benefits, but also provide private benefits (Narloch, Pascual and Drucker 2012; Midler et al. 2015). 
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wealth denoted 𝑤଴ and that has preferences over its ex-post final wealth denoted 𝑤௜ = 𝑤଴ + 𝜋௜. 1 
Added complexity comes from the fact that the decision is taken in a strategic context (where the 2 
game is aggregative (Acemoglu and Jensen 2013) and under the presence of a background risk 3 
potentially correlated to the foreground risk. 4 
2.3 The structure of preferences 5 
We assume that preferences over the random ex-post wealth can be represented by a two-parameter 6 
utility function 𝑉(𝜇, 𝑣) where 𝜇 and 𝑣 are the expected value and the variance of ex-post wealth, 7 
respectively (following Eichner and Wagener (2011) and Bontems and Nauges (2019)7). 8 
The expected ex-post wealth 𝜇 is as follows: 9 
𝜇(𝑔௜, 𝐿௜, 𝑔ି௜) = 𝑤଴ + 𝑎𝑔௜ + 𝜀𝐿௜ + 𝛽𝛿𝑔ି௜ 10 
and the variance of the ex-post wealth is written as 11 
𝑣(𝑔௜, 𝐿௜) = 𝑣௔𝑔௜ଶ + 𝑣ఌ𝐿௜ଶ + 2𝐿௜𝑔௜𝜎௔ఌ. 12 
Note that the variance does not depend on the decision of other farmers, while the expected wealth 13 
does.  14 
Following Meyer (1987), we assume that 𝑉 is a 𝐶ଷ function with 15 
𝑉ఓ > 0, 𝑉௩ < 0, 𝑉ఓఓ < 0, 𝑉ఓ௩ > 0 16 
The assumptions 𝑉ఓ > 0 and 𝑉ఓఓ < 0 entails that preferences are characterized by risk aversion. Risk 17 
neutrality would correspond to 𝑉௩ = 0. The assumption 𝑉ఓ௩ > 0 is the analogue of prudence in the 18 
expected utility framework. The mean-variance counterpart of the Arrow-Prat measure of absolute 19 
risk aversion is the marginal rate 𝛼 of substitution between 𝜇 and 𝑣: 20 
𝛼(𝜇, 𝑣) = −
𝑉௩
𝑉ఓ
> 0. 21 
Decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) preferences are represented by 𝛼ఓ < 0 and it means that 22 
the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in variance decreases when expected wealth 23 
increases. Also, variance vulnerability is obtained when 𝛼௩ > 0, which indicates that the marginal 24 
willingness to pay for a reduction in variance increases when wealth becomes more volatile. 25 
Following Eichner (2008), when these two conditions are met, the individual is said to be risk 26 
                                                 
7 Coyle (1999), Isik (2002) Serra et al. (2006) and Bontems and Nauges (2019) have also analyzed farmers’ production 
decisions in a mean-variance framework in the context of multiple risks (including background risk for Bontems and 
Nauges (2019)). Our contribution extends the analysis of production decisions in a risky environment to a public good 
game context. 
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vulnerable. Finally, to ensure second-order conditions in optimization programs, we consider that 1 
𝑉(𝜇, 𝑣) is quasi-concave or equivalently that: 2 
𝛼𝛼ఓ + 𝛼௩ > 0. 3 
2.4 Resolution of the farmer’s problem 4 
Farmer 𝑖 maximize 𝑉(𝜇, 𝑣) with respect to 𝑔௜ that belongs to the compact set [0, 𝐿௜] and for given 5 
strategies 𝑔ି௜ by other farmers: 6 
max
௚೔
𝑈(𝑔௜, 𝑔ି௜ , 𝐿௜) ≡ 𝑉(𝜇(𝑔௜, 𝐿௜ , 𝑔ି௜), 𝑣(𝑔௜, 𝐿௜)) 7 
Ignoring corner solutions, the first-order condition for an interior solution defines the best-response 8 
function 𝑔௜௥(𝑔ି௜) such that:8 9 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑔௜
= 𝑉ఓ
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜
+ 𝑉௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
= 0 10 
or equivalently 11 
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜
= 𝛼(𝜇, 𝑣)
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
 12 
At equilibrium, the marginal benefit of 𝑔௜  ቀ
డఓ
డ௚೔
= 𝑎 > 0ቁ is equalized with its marginal cost 13 
ቀ𝛼(𝜇, 𝑣) డ௩డ௚೔ቁ. The marginal cost decomposes as the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in 14 
variance times the marginal increase in variance of wealth. Importantly, the best-response decision 15 
𝑔௜௥(𝑔ି௜) depends on others’ decisions only through the expected wealth 𝜇 contained in 𝛼(𝜇, 𝑣).  16 
If both the cost of environment-friendly practices 𝑐௚ and the marginal benefit 𝑏 are known with 17 
certainty, the wealth function is linear in the decision variable and therefore the equilibrium is a 18 
corner solution: 𝑔௜ = 𝐿௜  if 𝑎 > 0 or 𝑔௜ = 0  if 𝑎 < 0. Note that this decision rule under certainty is 19 
independent of the other farmers’ actions because the wealth function is additive separable between 20 
𝑔௜ and  𝑔ି௜.  Note also that when there is no foreground risk and only a background risk (thus 𝑣௔ =21 
𝜎௔ఌ = 0), the variance is constant with respect to the decision 𝑔௜. Because 
డఓ
డ௚೔
= 𝑎, the equilibrium is 22 
once again a corner solution with : 𝑔௜ = 𝐿௜  if 𝑎 > 0 or 𝑔௜ = 0  if  𝑎 < 0.  23 
However, in the presence of foreground and background risk, and under DARA preferences, the 24 
game is with strategic complementarities between the land use decisions 𝑔௜ for 𝑖 = 1, . . .,n (see the 25 
                                                 
8 The assumption of quasi-concavity for 𝑉(𝜇, 𝑣) implies that the second order condition 𝜕ଶ𝑈/𝜕𝑔௜ଶ < 0 holds. 
9 
 
proof in the appendix A.2). The intuition is the following: whenever 𝛿 > 0, each time the allocation 1 
of land to environment-friendly practices by other farmers increases, it brings some additional 2 
benefits to the non-stochastic part of wealth for farmer 𝑖. Under DARA preferences, being richer 3 
entails that farmer 𝑖 is induced to take more risk and hence to increase land use with environment-4 
friendly practices. The main consequence of strategic complementarities is that there is potentially 5 
too low contributions compared to a situation where land allocations are decided upon coordination 6 
between farmers. As long as 𝛿 > 0, there is underinvestment from each farmer in 𝑔௜ because it 7 
generates a positive externality on others that is not taken into account when each farmer decides 8 
unilaterally of its land use allocation. 9 
It is also worth noting that the background risk is fair in the sense that its upscaling always raises the 10 
expected wealth. In the appendix A.1, we also characterize conditions under which an upscaling of 11 
the background risk never decreases the variance of wealth (a condition to be qualified as a risk) and 12 
under which it decreases utility so that it can be denoted as undesirable. 13 
 14 
2.5 Theoretical propositions tested in the experiment 15 
The model allows to explore how the land allocation decision between environment-friendly 16 
practices and conventional ones is impacted by the presence of foreground and/or background risk, 17 
and the existence of an incentive payment.  Comparative statics of the model is parsed with details in 18 
the appendix A3. In particular, the model allows to draw three propositions, which have been tested 19 
in an experiment whose design is detailed in the next section. 20 
Proposition 1: Foreground risk reduces the adoption of environment-friendly practices  21 
Proposition 2: Background risk reduces the adoption of environment-friendly practices, but 22 
only when they are risky 23 
Proposition 4: The incentive payment increases adoption of environment-friendly practices in 24 
all risk contexts 25 
 26 
3. Experimental design 27 
In order to test the empirical validity of the three propositions above, we have conducted a framed 28 
lab experiment based on a public good game. We choose a public good game to capture the 29 
ecosystem services provided by environment-friendly practices, such as pollination services or 30 
biocontrol, providing benefits for the community. Farmers decide how much of their land they would 31 
like to farm according to conventional (corresponding to the private account) or to environment-32 
friendly practices (corresponding to the public account).  33 
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3.1 Treatments 1 
In order to capture the presence or absence of foreground and background risk, the treatments differ 2 
by the volatility of the financial yields and costs.  3 
In the benchmark treatment, we consider the case of non-risky environment-friendly practice and 4 
participants know the fixed value of the parameters cg and b. In the other experimental treatments, 5 
we introduce risk on these parameters. In the foreground risk treatment (ForeOnly), participants are 6 
informed that cg can be either 𝑐௚ or  𝑐௚ , each with probability ½, corresponding to a risk-increasing 7 
practice. In the treatment with background risk only (BackOnly), the financial yield b can be either  8 
𝑏  or  𝑏 , each with probability ½ but cg is known (there is no foreground risk). The fourth treatment 9 
(Fore&Back) corresponds to the realistic situation where participants face both foreground and 10 
background risk.  11 
All parameters values are available in Table 1. Parameters have been chosen such that the expected 12 
profits are equal in all treatments. The background risk affecting financial yields originates from 13 
multiple sources of risk, frequently independent of each other and unlikely to cancel each other out. 14 
Therefore, we have chosen a volatility greater for the background risk (Var(b)=25) than for the 15 
foreground risk (Var(cg)=4). While the model allows for correlation between the foreground and 16 
background risk, the correlation is set to zero in the experiment. This allows to disentangle the 17 
impact of these two sources of risks, while their effects would generally be confounded in 18 
observational data.  19 
In order to study the impact of the introduction of an incentive payment to foster the adoption of 20 
environment-friendly practices in those different contexts of risk, a within-subject design is chosen: 21 
each participant makes two decisions, without and with the payment. It allows to compare individual 22 
contributions in a given risk set-up, before and after the implementation of the instrument. We do not 23 
control for order effects since we are not interested in the impact of the withdrawal of this support, 24 
which would be an unlikely policy scenario. 25 
The parameter has been chosen such that 𝑎 = 𝑃𝐴𝑌 − ൫𝑐௚ − 𝑐௖ − 𝛽൯ is negative in the no payment 26 
scenario (PAY=0) and positive in the payment scenario. In other words, there is a social dilemma in 27 
the absence of incentive payment: participants' best private strategy is not to allocate any land units 28 
at all to environment-friendly practices and to instead free-ride on others in order to earn the 29 
collective benefits. But the incentive payment solves the social dilemma since it compensates the 30 
opportunity cost of contributing to the public good.9 As shown in section 2.4, in the absence of 31 
foreground risk (Benchmark and BackOnly treatments), farmers therefore allocate all their land units 32 
towards the environment-friendly farming practices (gi=Li) in the payment scenario.   33 
 34 
                                                 
9 This assumption is realistic since, in the current CAP, the payments associated with agri-environmental contracts are 
set-up to cover up the opportunity cost of adopting green practices. Concerning the green payment, while its level was 
not chosen to compensate the opportunity cost of adoption greening requirements, it has been shown that it is higher than 
the compliance costs for a large majority of farmers (Louhichi et al. 2018). 
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In this game, farmers face strategic uncertainty because they don’t know whether others will 1 
contribute to the public good, even more so without pre-play communication. In all treatments, 2 
strategic uncertainty is kept constant by keeping constant group size, anonymity in the group and 3 
marginal incentives to contribute to the public good (𝛽 and 𝛿) as in Gangadharan and Nemes (2009). 4 
In the experiment, we analyse decisions in a group of n=2 players.10 5 
 6 
Table 1: parameters 7 
Treatments 
between-
subject 
Land 
endowment 
Li11 
(hectares) 
Financial 
yield 
b 
(points/ 
hectare) 
Cost of 
conventional 
practices 
cc 
(points 
/hectare) 
Cost of 
green 
practices 
cg 
(points 
/hectare) 
Efficiency 
factor of the 
green land 
𝛽(𝑔௜ + 𝛿𝑔ି௜  )  
(points 
/hectare) 
No 
payment 
scenario 
Payment 
scenario 
Nb of 
participants 
Benchmark 
𝑣௔ = 0 
𝑣ఌ = 0  
80 15 4 7 β=2 δ=1 
PAY=0 PAY=2 26 
ForeOnly 
𝑣௔ > 0 
𝑣ఌ = 0  
80 15 4 5 or 9* β=2 δ=1 
PAY=0 PAY=2 
29 
BackOnly 
𝑣௔ = 0 
𝑣ఌ > 0 
80 10 or 20* 4 7 β=2 δ=1 
PAY=0 PAY=2 
39 
Fore&Back 
𝑣௔ > 0 
𝑣ఌ > 0 
80 10 or 20* 4 5 or 9* β=2 δ=1 
PAY=0 PAY=2 
30 
Note: *equally probable 8 
3.2 Experimental procedure 9 
The sample chosen for this experiment is made of full-time students in agriculture (for at least 2 10 
years) of the Pays de la Loire region in France. While lab experiments with university students 11 
remain common, a growing number of experiments involve samples of professionals. Gneezy and 12 
Imas (2017) review evidence and conclude that it is important to elicit behaviour and preferences 13 
with non-standard populations that are closer to the theoretically relevant target population. The 14 
potential reasons for behavioural differences are the distribution of social preferences (Carpenter and 15 
Seki 2011), familiarity of the subject with the topic (Frechette 2011) and self-selection issue. As 16 
                                                 
10 While in reality the ecosystem services can benefit a larger perimeter where several farmers are operating, we have 
used the smallest possible group (2) to simplify the experiment. There is much literature on the effect of group size on 
contributions in public good games. For instance, Isaac et al. (1988) found no difference between groups of 4 and groups 
of 10 people. To our knowledge, there is no experimental evidence on the differences in the behaviours of individuals 
interacting in pairs (in a prisoners’ dilemma) and in groups of 4 persons. 
 
11 To reinforce the field context, we attempted to respect the same size as an average farm in the Pays de Loire region 
since most students come from the area. The average farm size in the area is 79.2 ha (Agreste 2017), so we chose 80 ha 
in our experiment. 
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mentioned in the results section, the agricultural students we recruited have strong connections with 1 
the farming environment, making them closer to stakeholders than other students.  2 
The experiment was run in May 2017 and presented to students during one of their classes after 3 
which they had 7 days to complete it on-line, with an exam question dedicated to the experiment. 4 
The experiment was programmed with Limesurvey. Participants were randomly assigned by the 5 
software to one of the four treatments when they first logged-on.  6 
At the beginning of the survey, participants were asked to read the instructions that explained the 7 
different parts of the survey and the monetary incentives. In each part of the survey, they answered 8 
questions that tested their understanding of the instructions. Instructions are available in the appendix 9 
C. 10 
The survey is divided into five parts. First, before the public good game, we have run two 11 
complementary tasks to elicit risk aversion and social preferences. Risk aversion has been shown to 12 
have a significant impact on decisions in public good games (Dickinson 1998), as well as in 13 
coordination games. Social preferences are also important drivers of contributions in public good 14 
games (Fischbacher and Gachter 2010; Balliet, Parks and Joireman 2009). 15 
The first part of the survey aims at eliciting risk attitudes. The game is a lottery-choice task derived 16 
from the investment game (Gneezy and Potters 1997; Charness and Gneezy 2010). The higher the 17 
number of points invested in the risky asset, the less risk averse is the participant. The relative 18 
simplicity of the method makes it a useful instrument for assessing risk preferences in the field 19 
(Charness, Gneezy and Imas 2013) and we believe it is also suitable for on-line elicitation. 20 
In the second part, to measure social preferences, we have used the Social Value Orientation (SVO) 21 
measure (Murphy, Ackermann and Handgraaf 2011). Participants are asked to participate in a set of 22 
dictator games where they have to share some money with an anonymous player. Within the SVO 23 
framework, it is assumed that individuals have heterogeneous motivations when evaluating different 24 
resource allocations between themselves and another person. As examples, a decision maker may 25 
endeavour to maximize her own payoff (individualistic), maximize (competitive) or minimize 26 
(inequality averse) the difference between her own and the other person’s payoff, or maximize joint 27 
payoffs (prosocial). 28 
The public good game is played in the third (no payment) and fourth (with payment) parts of the 29 
experiment. Participants do not choose between a public and a private account (as in artefactual 30 
public good games), rather they divide their land between ‘‘green farming” and ‘‘conventional 31 
farming”. We rely on a contextualized experiment because we believe that the experimental context 32 
can trigger signals, such as pro-social, pro-environmental or context-specific risk preferences, that 33 
have an effect on the decision-making process under study. Environmental factors and the culture in 34 
which individuals develop, as well as prior experience shape preferences and have a critical 35 
influence on how individuals interact (Gneezy and Imas 2017).   36 
We have chosen a “one-shot” design, which is different from most public goods experiments, where 37 
participants make repeated decisions in a single treatment and receive feedback between rounds. It 38 
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allows an asynchronous experimental design, which lessens the constraint on the number of 1 
participants connected at the same time. Moreover, as explained by Goeree et al (2002), the one-shot 2 
design mitigates the possibility of reciprocity or strategic attempts to trigger others’ reciprocity. 3 
Given the focus of the experiment on the impact of risk on the adoption of practices with public good 4 
properties, we did not want good or bad experiences with respect to others’ contribution to the public 5 
good to influence the game.  6 
Before making their decision, participants could see two tables explaining their individual payoff 7 
(depending on the number of land units allocated to environment-friendly practices by the 8 
participant, as well as the random draw(s)12) and the additional group payoff (depending on the total 9 
number of land units allocated to environment-friendly practices in their group). They were told that 10 
their total payoff is the sum of the individual and the additional group payoff. 11 
In the last part, qualitative and quantitative information was collected from the participants using 12 
survey questions. In particular, we asked participants to state what would be the main reason for non-13 
adoption and the main lever likely to favour their adoption if they were a farmer. All participants 14 
were invited to answer these questions, whether they adopted these practices or not in the 15 
experiment. 16 
Participants were informed that their decisions would affect the size of the earnings they would 17 
receive. Points earned in each part (1 to 4) of the game are summed and converted at a known fixed 18 
rate into euros (200 points=1 euro). At the end of the experiment, in order to calculate the final 19 
earnings, all participants were randomly matched in pairs and the computer carried out random 20 
draws. A multi-brand gift card was sent to each participant via ordinary mail with a credit 21 
corresponding to the winnings in the survey.  Final earnings were thus between 9 and 23€, with an 22 
average around 16€. It took on average 30 minutes to complete the survey. 23 
4. Experimental results 24 
4.1 Our sample: descriptive statistics 25 
124 agricultural students took part in the experiment. The participants were on average 20 years old 26 
and 54% were male. The following numbers indicate that they are concerned with agriculture and 27 
can be considered as stakeholders. 58% of them have farmers in their closest family members 28 
(parents, siblings or parental siblings). 44% of them spend more than 30 days a year on a farm. 30% 29 
of them declare they will be farmers before their thirties, and 40% do not reject this option. Less than 30 
one third of the participants already know they do not want to become farmers in the future.  31 
No significant differences were observed in the socio-demographic characteristics, risk aversion and 32 
social preferences in the four treatment groups, suggesting that random allocation of participants to 33 
the different treatments had the desired effect.  34 
                                                 
12 In treatments ForeOnly and BackOnly, the table with the individual payoff had 2 lines corresponding to the two 
possible outcomes of the draw. While in treatment Fore&Back, the table had 4 lines, corresponding to the four different 
outcomes combining the two draws. 
14 
 
Concerning social preferences, adapting Murphy et al.’s procedure (2011), we classify the 1 
participants in two categories: the pro-social players (47%), who aim at maximizing the joint payoff 2 
of both players or at minimizing inequalities, and the other players (competitive and individualistic) 3 
(53%). With respect to risk aversion, we find that participants are willing to invest 43.4 % of their 4 
endowment in the risky option, slightly less than results of previous experiments (Charness and 5 
Gneezy 2012). No participants invested all their endowment in the risky asset, they are therefore all 6 
risk averse according to this elicitation method. Participants who invested fewer points in the risky 7 
asset are considered as more risk averse. Moreover, we checked that our results are not impacted by 8 
potential communication between the participants given that six and half days passed between the 9 
connection of the first participant and the last one. Indeed, one could argue that experiments 10 
conducted on-line lack control compared to lab experiments, in particular because once the 11 
experiment has begun, it is more difficult to control information flow about the task (Harrison and 12 
List 2004), especially given that participants know each other. To measure whether our results are 13 
impacted by this effect, we have verified that the submission date and the time dedicated to 14 
answering the survey (mean: 29 minutes, s.d: 16.5) are not significantly different across treatments 15 
(Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test: Chi2(3)=2.88 and p=0.4105).  16 
On average over all treatment groups, the average number of hectares farmed according to 17 
environment-friendly farming is positive and equals to 50.64 ha (over a total of 80 ha). 95% of the 18 
participants allocated at least 20 hectares to the green practices in the no payment scenario. Our data 19 
thus suggest that most participants depart from payoff-maximization and voluntary contribute to 20 
environment-friendly farming, potentially due to their pro-environmental or pro-social preferences. 21 
This is consistent with previous experimental literature that has shown that individuals contribute on 22 
average more to the public good than predicted by the Nash equilibrium (see for instance Ledyard 23 
(1995) for a review on public good games). In our experiment, this is true in all treatments (Figure 24 
1). 25 
 26 
Figure 1: Average number of hectares cultivated with environment-friendly practices per treatment 
 
 
 27 
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4.2 Discussion of the empirical validity of the theoretical propositions 1 
Results are structured in order to shed light on the empirical validity of the three propositions drawn 2 
from the theoretical model. First, we examine the differences across treatments in the number of 3 
hectares farmed with environment-friendly practices using nonparametric tests (results are presented 4 
in the appendix B). Second, we use an econometrical analysis to find out what motivated decisions. 5 
The dependant variable is the number of hectares farmed with environment-friendly practices. We 6 
rely on a random effect panel tobit model to account for the nature of the data (the number of 7 
hectares are left-censored at zero and right-censored at 80). We use random effects at the subject 8 
level to capture the unobserved heterogeneity between participants.13 The variables are described in 9 
Table 2 and the results are shown in Table 3.  10 
Impact of foreground risk on the adoption of green practices (comparison Benchmark-11 
ForeOnly). 12 
In the presence of foreground risk, participants allocated less hectares to the environment-friendly 13 
practices than those in the benchmark treatment (variable ForeOnly in Table 3 and non-parametric 14 
tests in the appendix B). This result confirms proposition 1 of the theoretical model. It is consistent 15 
with the fact that all participants are averse to (foreground) risk according to our elicitation method. 16 
We confirm a well-known result in the agricultural empirical literature: risk-increasing environment-17 
friendly practices are less adopted than non-risky practices (Babcock, Fraser and Lekakis 2003; Acs 18 
et al. 2009). 19 
Impact of background risk on the adoption of green practices (comparison Benchmark-20 
BackOnly and ForeOnly-Fore&Back). 21 
Participants allocated less hectares to the environment-friendly practices in the presence of both 22 
foreground and background risks than in the treatment with only foreground risk (variable 23 
Fore&Back and ForeOnly in Table 3 and non-parametric tests in the appendix B). This suggests that 24 
participants take less risk (by reducing their commitment to risk-increasing environment-friendly 25 
practices) in the presence of background risk, as stated by the risk vulnerability conjecture 26 
(Eeckhoudt et al. 1996; Gollier and Pratt 1996).14  27 
The model predicts that the background risk does not impact the allocation of land to green farming 28 
in the absence of foreground risk. However, in the experiment, we observe that, even when 29 
environment-friendly practices are not risky, participants allocate less hectares to these practices 30 
when there is background risk than when there is none (BackOnly vs. Benchmark). This result 31 
cannot be explained by our theoretical model. It suggests that background risk can reduce the 32 
                                                 
13 The main advantage of using random effects over fixed effects estimations is that it allows for covariates that are 
constant over time, such as the individual characteristics of the participants (Demidenko 2005).  
14 Moreover, according to proposition 3 (see appendix A3), the contribution to environment-friendly practices decreases 
when the covariance between both risks increases. We could therefore assume that the reduction of the contribution to 
environment-friendly practices in the treatment Fore&Back would be even more pronounced if the experiment had been 
designed with positively correlated risks. 
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willingness to contribute to a public good, a question that remains to be explored both empirically 1 
and theoretically.  2 
Proposition 2 is therefore only partially verified: background risk reduces the adoption of 3 
environment-friendly practices, whether they are risky or not. 4 
Impact of the incentive payment (comparison “no payment”- “with payment”) 5 
We have introduced interaction terms between the payment variable and the treatment variables in 6 
the econometric model to further analyse the impact of the subsidy in the various risk scenarios 7 
(PAY*treatment in Table 3). The model predicts that the incentive payment increases adoption of 8 
environment-friendly practices in all risk contexts (proposition 4). It is only partially verified with 9 
the experimental results: participants allocated significantly more hectares to the environment-10 
friendly practices in the payment scenario than in the absence of incentive payment in all treatments 11 
but Fore&Back. Indeed, the interaction term is significant only in Fore&Back (-24.05 ha farmed with 12 
environment-friendly practices) and nearly cancels the average impact of the payment (+29.36 ha), 13 
leading to a very small impact of the subsidy when both risks are present (+5.31 ha). 14 
 15 
Table 2: Summary of the dependant variables used in Table 3 16 
Name of the variable Description Statistics 
Benchmark 
ForeOnly 
BackOnly 
Fore&Back 
Between-subject treatment variables 
1 if the subject is assigned to the treatment with no risk 
(Benchmark), foreground risk only (ForeOnly), background 
risk only (BackOnly) and both types of risks (Fore&Back).  
 
PAY Within-subject treatment variable 1 if there is an incentive payment, 0 otherwise 
 
PAY * Benchmark  
(and other treatments) 
Interaction term between treatment variables and the 
payment variable PAY 
 
prosocial 1 if the subject is prosocial according to the social value orientation measure, 0 otherwise 
0: 53%  
1: 47% 
PAY * prosocial Interaction term between the dummies prosocial and PAY  
risk aversion 
Number of point not invested in the risky asset in the risk 
aversion elicitation task (between 0 and 500). The lower the 
number of points invested, the more risk averse is the 
participant. 
mean: 282 
sd: 80 
install_family 
 
1 if the participant plans to become a farmer and has 
farmers in his/her family (father, mother, siblings, uncle, 
ant), 0 otherwise 
0: 73% 
1: 27% 
install_nofamily 
1 if the participant plans to become a farmer and has no 
farmers in his/her family (father, mother, siblings, uncle, 
ant), 0 otherwise 
0: 96% 
1: 4% 
impact_envt  
1 if the subject thinks agricultural practices have a very 
negative/rather negative/rather positive/very positive impact 
on the environment, 0  otherwise 
Very negative: 9% 
(reference) 
Rather negative: 65% 
Rather positive: 24% 
Very positive: 2% 
  17 
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Table 3: Results of the regression models (coefficient and statistical significance, random effects 1 
panel tobit) 2 
VARIABLES number of 
hectares farmed  
with 
environment-
friendly 
practices 
sigma_u sigma_e 
ForeOnly -18.47**   
 (8.856)   
BackOnly  -19.87**   
 (8.313)   
Fore&Back  -32.69***   
 (8.772)   
PAY 29.36***   
 (8.418)   
PAY * ForeOnly -9.489   
 (10.21)   
PAY * BackOnly -7.603   
 (9.641)   
PAY * Fore&Back -24.05**   
 (10.02)   
Prosocial 14.68**   
 (5.826)   
PAY * prosocial -10.95*   
 (6.303)   
risk aversion -0.0134   
 (0.0326)   
install_nofamily 43.93***   
 (16.12)   
install_family 1.795   
 (5.881)   
impact_envt_negative -7.686   
 (9.466)   
impact_envt_positive -6.917   
 (10.64)   
impact_envt_verypositive -35.86**   
 (17.82)   
Constant 75.85*** 20.55*** 22.31*** 
 (14.17) (2.715) (1.782) 
Observations 248    
Number of id 124    
Rho  0.459 0.083   
Log likelihood 
Wald chi2(14)      
Prob > chi2 
-812.032 
67.15 
0.00 
   
Note: 10 left-censored observations, 155 uncensored observations, 83 right-censored observations. The regression 
coefficients are relative to the benchmark treatment and no payment scenario. The Chi2 values provide evidence of the 
models’ explanatory power. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates. The number of stars 
indicates the significance level :  *** is significant at 1 %, ** is significant at 5 %, * is significant at 10 %. 
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4.3 Impact of individual variables 1 
Besides treatment effects, the random effect tobit results allow to comment on the impact of other 2 
variables collected in the on-line survey. Controlling for these socio-demographic and attitudinal 3 
factors in the experiment offers a useful complement to the theoretical model, where the structure of 4 
preferences is simplified. 5 
A decision-maker’s risk attitude is often considered as essential for explaining and forecasting farm 6 
management behavior (Vollmer, Hermann and Mußhoff 2017). However, here, risk aversion as 7 
elicited in the simple portfolio investment game does not seem to explain decisions to farm with 8 
risky environment-friendly practices (risk aversion variable in Table 3), and this is true in all 9 
treatments (model with interaction terms not presented here). This result is consistent with 10 
Gangadharan and Nemes (2009), who did not find either that elicited risk aversion provides a 11 
consistent pattern of behaviour in their public good game with uncertainty. The use of behavioural 12 
elicitation method for risk preferences has recently been challenged in the literature. Despite their 13 
widespread use in the lab, these methods are unproven for predicting real world farming behaviour 14 
(Hellerstein, Higgins and Horowitz 2013). Moreover, several authors have shown that risk 15 
preferences are not stable across elicitation methods (Pedroni et al. 2017; Reynaud and Couture 16 
2012; Brunette et al. 2015; Deck et al. 2013; Soane and Chmiel 2005; Crosetto and Filippin 2016; 17 
Deck, Lee and Reyes 2014; Weber, Blais and Betz 2002; Dave et al. 2010). In particular, Dave et al. 18 
(2010) show that the simplest measure (such as the one we used) have an inferior predictive 19 
accuracy. Choosing a lottery-choice measure of risk preferences therefore implies a trade-off 20 
between the cognitive burden for the respondents and the predictive performance. We thus cannot 21 
disregard the hypothesis that the investment game task we chose provides an unreliable measure of 22 
participants’ risk aversion. 23 
We observe a significant impact of social value orientation, as defined by Murphy et al. (2011), on 24 
decisions: pro-social individuals are more willing to farm with environment-friendly practices than 25 
the others. We also observe a negative and significant impact of the interaction term between 26 
payment and pro-social individuals, suggesting that the incentive is more effective in changing non-27 
pro-social individual behaviours (as in, for example, Midler et al. 2015). Still, it increases 28 
cooperation even among pro-social individuals. Previous studies have documented the impact of 29 
farmers' environmental attitude on the adoption of environment-friendly practices and on the 30 
acceptance rate of agri‐environmental policies (Beedell and Rehman 2000; Vanslembrouck, 31 
Huylenbroeck and Verbeke 2002; Willock et al. 1999). Here, we found that participants who think 32 
that agricultural practices have a very positive impact on the environment farmed significantly less 33 
hectares with environment-friendly practices in the experiment. We think that those answers can 34 
reflect a form of disagreement with the experiment postulate that some agricultural practices are not 35 
environment-friendly. It could illustrate that some farmers are still not convinced about the need to 36 
change practices since they believe conventional practices are not harmful. It could also be that 37 
participants perceive the payment instrument as an attempt by the administration to control 38 
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individual decision (Thomas et al. 2019). The participants with such beliefs are not willing to bear 1 
the extra cost and risk of more environment-friendly practices in the experiment.  2 
Plans for the future are important explanatory factors of the agricultural students’ decisions in the 3 
game. 80% of those who plan to become a farmer but have no farmers in their family declare they 4 
are willing to set-up an organic farm (while only 30% of those planning to set-up as a farmer within 5 
the family context plan to do so). They are also more likely to farm with environment-friendly 6 
practices in the game, compared to those who do not plan to become farmers (variable 7 
install_nofamily significant). This is not the case for those who plan to set-up within the family 8 
context (variable install_family not significant). This result is in line with what has been observed in 9 
France: new farmers that are not taking over their parents’ agricultural holding are more likely to 10 
engage in organic farming (Ambiaud 2011).  11 
5. Discussion 12 
We discuss here the contributions and limitations of this study, suggestions for future research and 13 
the policy implications of our results. 14 
In order to understand the impact of background risk (such as climate change) on the adoption of 15 
environment-friendly practices, often perceived as risk-increasing, we have developed a theoretical 16 
model and designed a public good experiment that combined background and foreground risks. To 17 
our knowledge, we are the first to study how background risk influences the contributions to a public 18 
good game, in particular when it is combined with foreground risk. 19 
Based on a two-moment decision model, we have found that background risk reduces the adoption of 20 
risky environment-friendly practices. We have also demonstrated that an incentive payment per 21 
hectare of land farmed with environment-friendly practices encourages the adoption of such practices 22 
in a risky context with foreground or background risk. Furthermore, an experiment has allowed to 23 
test these theoretical propositions, but also to go further: we find that background risk such as 24 
climate change can reduce the willingness to engage in environment-friendly practices with public 25 
good properties, even if they are not risk-increasing. We also find that an incentive payment 26 
designed to solve the social dilemma is not sufficient in the presence of both foreground and 27 
background risks: players do not allocate significantly more land to green practices when they 28 
receive the payment.  29 
The main limitations of our study are due to the necessary simplification of reality in a model or an 30 
experiment. First, the risk setting is over simplified. For example, in the theoretical model, we do not 31 
take into account the preferences for skewness and kurtosis, while there is empirical evidence on the 32 
importance of downside risk for farmers (Kim et al. 2014; Zuo, Nauges and Wheeler 2015). 33 
Moreover, while the model does, the experimental design did not allow to test the impact of the 34 
correlation between the foreground and the background risks. Improving the methods used to elicit 35 
individual risk preferences could also allow to better distinguish the role of risk aversion and risk 36 
vulnerability from the influence of the treatment variables.  37 
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Second, in the experiment, the choice of parameters fails to capture the heterogeneity in farming 1 
contexts and green agricultural practices. Further research could focus on testing whether our results 2 
are robust to a change in the average value and standard deviation of the costs and benefits 3 
parameters, which could be chosen in order to better represent a specific green practice and increase 4 
the external validity. More experimental sessions would have also allowed to run some sensitivity 5 
analysis on the impact of farm size (impacting the size of the background risk) and the impact of the 6 
payment size. 7 
Despite these limitations, the results shed light on existing agricultural policies. In the actual 8 
European agricultural context, both protecting the environment and managing uncertainties are issues 9 
that are gaining importance (European Commission 2017). However, CAP support to sustainable 10 
agriculture and risk management are mostly discussed separately so far and targeted by different 11 
policy instruments. Our results suggest that instruments aiming at motivating farmers to better 12 
manage the environment should take into account not only the risk associated with the adoption of 13 
more environment-friendly practices, but also the background risk. Indeed, it is often argued that 14 
CAP incentives set-up as a fixed amount per hectare received regardless of the market conditions, 15 
such as agri-environmental measures, could improve environment-friendly practices adoption by 16 
covering the extra cost and the foregone revenues (including the risk premium). Yet, in our 17 
experiment, such fixed payments appeared to be less efficient in the presence of both foreground and 18 
background risk. This questions the efficiency of agri-environmental payments, set-up as a fixed 19 
subsidy per hectare, in the presence of multiple risk sources such as pest attacks, climate hazards, 20 
price volatility and climate change.  21 
One response could be to increase the payment for adoption of environment-friendly practices in 22 
highly risky environment. It might make the payments more effective in triggering adoption but it 23 
has two limits: first, it might be difficult to do because the amount must comply with the WTO rules 24 
and cannot exceed the foreseen costs of changing practices. This rule prevents management 25 
authorities to sufficiently increase the payment level to integrate the cost of risk in their payments. 26 
Second, it might be less cost-effective than other risk management tools.   27 
In the CAP 2020 proposal, the European Commission proposes to make risk management tools 28 
mandatory for all member states (European Commission 2017). These tools, which include 29 
insurance, mutual funds, saving accounts, ad-hoc payments and fiscal measures, were already 30 
available in the previous CAP under pillar II, but implemented by member states on a voluntary 31 
basis. As a result, the share of CAP funds being spent on crisis and prevention measures remained 32 
very low (Bardaji and Garrido 2016). Our results suggest that such instruments, which are helping 33 
farmers manage background risk, could also impact positively their willingness to adopt green 34 
practices. Making them mandatory could thus generate environmental co-benefits, if they are not 35 
financed using the agri-environmental instruments funding.  36 
Building bridges between environmental objectives and risk management by proposing risk 37 
management tools to farmers that are conditional on the transition towards more sustainable practices 38 
could foster the adoption of riskier and more costly green practices while helping farmers 39 
21 
 
maintaining a safe level of income (Huang 2002; Coble et al. 2003). The experience “Fondo 1 
Risemina Mais” (Veneto, Italy) is one of the very few experiments in Europe of an agricultural-2 
environmental insurance  (PANEurope n.d.). In this program, farmers are offered a crop insurance 3 
financed by a mutual fund in case of pest damage to maize, as well as damage due to adverse 4 
weather conditions; and in return they agree to comply with good agricultural practices and 5 
integrated pest management. The payment is therefore not systematic, but triggered in case of 6 
unfavorable local climatic conditions or pest attacks. To our best knowledge, this scheme has not 7 
been evaluated yet. There is scope for an experimental study to analyze the impact of such an 8 
instrument on the adoption of environment-friendly practices given the numerous behavioral factors 9 
likely to influence the perceived value of such an insurance by farmers (Coble et al. 2003; Chèze et 10 
al. 2020). Ignoring these factors may lead to error when predicting participation.  11 
 12 
6. Conclusion 13 
The critical impact of uncertainty on the adoption of environment-friendly practices has not fully 14 
been explored yet: the analysis has been restricted to the impact of foreground risk. However, while 15 
farmers can choose to avoid the uncertainty associated with environment-friendly practices by 16 
farming their land with well-established and less risky practices, they are also exposed to background 17 
risks beyond their control. Considering climate change is a major source of background risk in the 18 
agricultural sector, it is important to take it into account to improve our understanding of farmers’ 19 
risk taking decisions. Using a theoretical model and a framed lab experiment with 124 French 20 
agricultural students based on a public good game, we have analysed the combined impact of 21 
foreground and background risk on decisions to adopt environment-friendly practices and evaluated 22 
how incentive payments may influence adoption decisions in such a risky environment. 23 
We observe that adopting green farming practices is less likely when they are risky. More 24 
interestingly, we show that background risk is also detrimental to the adoption of green farming 25 
practices, suggesting that participants are both risk averse and risk vulnerable. While the theoretical 26 
literature is silent on this point, we find that background risk can reduce the willingness to engage in 27 
environment-friendly practices with public good properties, even if there are not risk-increasing. 28 
Moreover, we highlight that a given incentive payment can efficiently increase the adoption of green 29 
practices when only one source of risk exist but can fail to do so in the presence of both foreground 30 
and background risks. In terms of policy implications, our research demonstrates the limited 31 
efficiency of a fixed payment per hectare (such as agri-environmental payment) to encourage the 32 
adoption of risky environment-friendly practices in the presence of background risk. More generally, 33 
our results suggest the importance of building bridges between environmental objectives and risk 34 
management in the CAP, for example by proposing risk management tools to farmers that are 35 
conditional on the transition towards more sustainable systems. 36 
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Appendix A: theoretical model 1 
Having laid down the foundations of the model in the text in section 2, we derive the results here. 2 
We start by establishing the nature of the background risk in subsection A.1. In A.2, we characterize 3 
the nature of the game by showing that there are strategic complementarities between decisions if 4 
preferences are DARA. In A.3, we establish a number of comparative statics results. 5 
A.1 The nature of the background risk 6 
Let us first analyze in details the nature of the background risk. To do so, it is convenient to use the 7 
size of land 𝐿௜  for upscaling since the background risk is proportional to it.  8 
First, the background risk is fair because upscaling the risk always raises the expected wealth 9 
(𝜕𝜇/𝜕𝐿௜ = 𝜀 > 0). Second, this background risk is actually a risk only if its upscaling never 10 
decreases the variance of the final wealth (alternatively, one could say that the size 𝐿௜ is risk 11 
increasing): 12 
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝐿௜
= 2𝑣ఌ𝐿௜ + 2𝑔௜𝜎௔ఌ ≥ 0 13 
which happens if and only if the size 𝐿௜ is large enough for a given choice 𝑔௜: 14 
𝐿௜ ≥ −𝑔௜
𝜎௔ఌ
𝑣ఌ
 15 
Note that if 𝜎௔ఌ > 0 (positive correlation between 𝑎 and 𝜀), this condition is always met and the size 16 
𝐿௜ is risk increasing. On the contrary, when the correlation between the foreground and the 17 
background risk is negative, and given that the decision 𝑔௜ satisfies 𝑔௜ ≤ 𝐿௜, a sufficient condition for 18 
𝐿௜ to be risk increasing is that −𝜎௔ఌ ≤ 𝑣ఌ. 19 
Finally, the background risk is undesirable if its upscaling decreases utility 𝑈: 20 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐿௜
= 𝑉ఓ
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝐿௜
+ 𝑉௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝐿௜
≤ 0 21 
or equivalently: 22 
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝐿௜
≥
𝜀
𝛼
 23 
i.e. if and only if 𝐿௜ is sufficiently risk increasing. 24 
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A.2 The nature of the game 1 
To determine the nature of the game between farmers, we need to derive the marginal influence of 2 
others´ strategy on farmer’s 𝑖 action. Let us derivate totally the first-order condition w.r.t. 𝑔௜ and 𝑔ି௜ 3 
to determine the slope of the best-response function: 4 
൬𝑉ఓఓ
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜
+ 𝑉ఓ௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
൰
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔ି௜
𝑑𝑔ି௜ +
𝜕ଶ𝑈
𝜕𝑔௜ଶ
𝑑𝑔௜ = 0 5 
recalling that 𝑔ି௜ only intervenes in expected wealth of farmer 𝑖 (and not in its variance). 6 
It follows that: 7 
𝑑𝑔௜
𝑑𝑔ି௜
= −
డఓ
డ௚ష೔
డమ௎
డ௚೔
మ
൬𝑉ఓఓ
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜
+ 𝑉ఓ௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
൰ 8 
The sign of the slope is determined by the sign of the term brackets as డ
మ௎
డ௚೔
మ < 0 because of second 9 
order condition and  డఓ
డ௚ష೔
= 𝛽𝛿 ≥ 0. Recall now that డఓ
డ௚೔
> 0 and that the first-order condition also 10 
imposes that డ௩
డ௚೔
> 0. Furthermore, 𝑉ఓఓ < 0 because of risk aversion and 𝑉ఓ௩ > 0 because of 11 
prudence. It follows that, in this case, the sign is a priori ambiguous. Nevertheless we can show that 12 
at the equilibrium: 13 
𝑉ఓఓ
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜
+ 𝑉ఓ௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
= ൫𝑉ఓఓ𝛼 + 𝑉ఓ௩൯
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
 14 
and also that: 15 
𝛼ఓ = −
𝑉ఓఓ𝛼 + 𝑉ఓ௩
𝑉ఓ
< 0 (DARA)  16 
It follows that: 17 
𝑉ఓఓ
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜
+ 𝑉ఓ௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
= −𝛼ఓ𝑉ఓ
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
> 0. 18 
Hence, we get: 19 
𝑑𝑔௜
𝑑𝑔ି௜
= 𝛽𝛿𝛼ఓ𝑉ఓ
డ௩
డ௚೔
డమ௎
డ௚೔
మ
≥ 0 20 
and ௗ௚೔
ௗ௚ష೔
= 0 when 𝛿 = 0. In other words, under DARA preferences and when 𝛿 > 0, the land use 21 
game between farmers entails strategic complementarities between the land use decisions 𝑔௜ for 𝑖 =22 
1. . . 𝑛.  23 
30 
 
A.3 Comparative statics 1 
In this section, we derive the comparative statics of the equilibrium w.r.t to different parameters. For 2 
any parameter 𝑝, it suffices to differentiate totally the system of first-order conditions: 3 
𝜕𝑈௜(𝑔௜, 𝑔ି௜ , 𝑝)
𝜕𝑔௜
= 0 for any 𝑖 = 1. . . 𝑛 4 
and we get: 5 
(A1)                            ப
మ୙౟
ப୥౟
మ dg୧ + ∑
பమ୙౟
ப୥౟ ப୥ౠ୨ஷ୧
dg୨ +
பమ୙౟
ப୥౟ ப୮
dp = 0 for any i = 1. . . n 6 
Let us compute first the cross-derivative term డ
మ௎೔
డ௚೔డ௣
. We obtain that: 7 
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑝
= ൬𝑉ఓఓ
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑝
+ 𝑉ఓ௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑝
൰
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜
+ ൬𝑉ఓ௩
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑝
+ 𝑉௩௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑝
൰
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
+𝑉ఓ
𝜕ଶ𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑝
+ 𝑉௩
𝜕ଶ𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑝
 8 
Rearranging, this can be rewritten as follows: 9 
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑝
= ൬𝑉ఓఓ
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜
+ 𝑉ఓ௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
൰
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑝
+ ൬𝑉ఓ௩
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜
+ 𝑉௩௩
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
൰
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑝
+𝑉ఓ
𝜕ଶ𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑝
+ 𝑉௩
𝜕ଶ𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑝
 10 
Now, recall that: 11 
𝛼ఓ = −
𝑉ఓఓ𝛼 + 𝑉ఓ௩
𝑉ఓ
< 0 (DARA) 12 
and that: 13 
𝛼௩ = −
𝑉ఓ௩𝛼 + 𝑉௩௩
𝑉ఓ
> 0 (Variance vulnerability) 14 
Replacing, we obtain: 15 
 (A2)                    డ
మ௎೔
డ௚೔డ௣
= (− డ௩
డ௚೔
𝛼ఓ𝑉ఓ)
డఓ
డ௣
+ (− డ௩
డ௚೔
𝛼௩𝑉ఓ)
డ௩
డ௣
+ 𝑉ఓ
డమఓ
డ௚೔డ௣
+ 𝑉௩
డమ௩
డ௚೔డ௣
 16 
To do the comparative statics, let us specialize the model to two farmers as in the experiment (𝑛 =17 
2). In that case, we get from equation (A1 ), for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖: 18 
 (A3)                                             ப୥౟
ப୮
= ଵ
୼
൬ ப
మ୙౟
ப୥౟ ப୥ౠ
பమ୙ౠ
ப୥ౠ ப୮
− ப
మ୙ౠ
ப୥ౠ
మ
பమ୙౟
ப୥౟ ப୮
൰ 19 
Where: 20 
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𝛥 =
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝ଶ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜ଶ
−
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑔௝
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑔௝
> 0 1 
because of the stability of the Nash equilibrium. 2 
 3 
Impact of change in variances 𝒗𝒈, 𝒗𝒃 and covariance 𝝈𝒂𝜺 4 
Consider first a change in variance of the background and foreground risks.  5 
Let us start with the foreground risk variance 𝑣௚ = 𝑣௔. Consider equation (A2) for the 𝑣௔ parameter: 6 
The variance only appears in the second and last terms since it does not affect the expected wealth 𝜇. 7 
We have: 8 
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑣௔
= 𝑔௜ଶ and 
𝜕ଶ𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑣௔
= 2𝑔௜ . 9 
Consequently, 10 
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑣௔
= −
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
𝛼௩𝑉ఓ𝑔௜ଶ + 2𝑔௜𝑉௩ < 0 11 
An increase in the foreground risk variance decreases the marginal utility of risk taking 𝑔௜. 12 
Now using (A3), we have: 13 
𝜕𝑔௜
𝜕𝑣௔
=
1
𝛥
ቆ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑔௝
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝𝜕𝑣௔
−
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝ଶ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑣௔
ቇ < 0 14 
once again because of strategic complementarities ( డ
మ௎೔
డ௚೔డ௚ೕ
> 0) and concavity (డ
మ௎ೕ
డ௚ೕ
మ < 0). 15 
Proposition 1. An increase in the variance of the foreground risk decreases the land allocation 16 
choice to environment-friendly and risky practices. 17 
Let us continue with the background risk variance 𝑣௕ = 𝑣ఌ . Consider equation (A2) for the 𝑣ఌ 18 
parameter.  19 
The variance only appears in the second and last terms since it does not affect the expected wealth 𝜇. 20 
Moreover, we have 21 
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑣ఌ
= 𝐿௜ଶ and 
𝜕ଶ𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑣ఌ
= 0. 22 
Consequently, we obtain that  23 
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑣ఌ
= −
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
𝛼௩𝑉ఓ𝐿௜ଶ < 0 24 
An increase in the background risk variance always decreases the marginal utility of risk taking 𝑔௜. 25 
Now using (A3), we have 26 
𝜕𝑔௜
𝜕𝑣ఌ
=
1
𝛥
ቆ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑔௝
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝𝜕𝑣ఌ
−
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝ଶ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑣ఌ
ቇ < 0 27 
32 
 
because of strategic complementarities ( డ
మ௎೔
డ௚೔డ௚ೕ
> 0) and concavity (డ
మ௎ೕ
డ௚ೕ
మ < 0). 1 
In the absence of foreground risk (𝑣௔ = 0), an increase in the variance of the background risk has no 2 
impact on 𝑔௜.  3 
Proposition 2. An increase in the variance of the background risk decreases the land allocation 4 
choice to environment-friendly but only when these practices are risky. 5 
Last, we analyze the impact of the correlation between the background and the foreground risk. 6 
Consider equation (A2) for the 𝜎௔ఌ parameter. There, the covariance 𝜎௔ఌ only appears in the second 7 
and last terms as it does not affect the expected wealth 𝜇. We have: 8 
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝜎௔ఌ
= 2𝐿௜𝑔௜ and 
𝜕ଶ𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝜎௔ఌ
= 2𝐿௜. 9 
Consequently: 10 
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝜎௔ఌ
= −2
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
𝛼௩𝑉ఓ𝐿௜𝑔௜ + 2𝐿௜𝑉௩ < 0 11 
An increase in the covariance decreases the marginal utility of risk taking 𝑔௜, whatever the sign of 12 
this correlation. 13 
Finally, using (A3), we have: 14 
𝜕𝑔௜
𝜕𝜎௔ఌ
=
1
𝛥
ቆ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑔௝
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝𝜕𝜎௔ఌ
−
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝ଶ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝜎௔ఌ
ቇ < 0 15 
once again because of strategic complementarities ( డ
మ௎೔
డ௚೔డ௚ೕ
> 0) and concavity (డ
మ௎ೕ
డ௚ೕ
మ < 0). 16 
Proposition 3. A decrease in the covariance between the foreground and the background risks 17 
increases the land allocation choice to environment-friendly and risky practices. 18 
 19 
The impact of the incentive payment 20 
The parameter 𝑃𝐴𝑌 affects positively the expected profit only through the mean of 𝑎. Consider 21 
equation (A2) for the 𝑃𝐴𝑌 parameter. From the definition of 𝜇 and 𝑣, we have: 22 
𝜕𝜇
𝜕𝑃𝐴𝑌
= 𝑔௜ and 
𝜕ଶ𝜇
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑃𝐴𝑌
= 1 23 
And: 24 
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑃𝐴𝑌
=
𝜕ଶ𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑃𝐴𝑌
= 0. 25 
It follows that: 26 
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑃𝐴𝑌
= ൬−
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
𝛼ఓ𝑉ఓ൰ 𝑔௜ + 𝑉ఓ > 0. 27 
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The payment increases the marginal utility of 𝑔௜. 1 
Now using (A3), we have 2 
𝜕𝑔௜
𝜕𝑃𝐴𝑌
=
1
𝛥
ቆ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑔௝
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝𝜕𝑃𝐴𝑌
−
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝ଶ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑃𝐴𝑌
ቇ > 0 3 
because of strategic complementarities ( డ
మ௎೔
డ௚೔డ௚ೕ
> 0) and concavity (డ
మ௎ೕ
డ௚ೕ
మ < 0). 4 
Proposition 4. An increase in 𝑃𝐴𝑌 induces each farmer to raise its land use allocation of 5 
environment-friendly practices.15 6 
 7 
The impact of strategic complementarities 8 
The impact of the parameter 𝛿 that scales the importance of strategic complementarities can also be 9 
evaluated using the above analysis. We have the following result. 10 
Proposition 5. An increase in 𝛿, that is the relative importance of others’ actions in individual 11 
payoff, leads each farmer to raise its own land use allocation to environment-friendly practices. 12 
From equation (A3), we obtain: 13 
𝜕𝑔௜
𝜕𝛿
=
1
𝛥
ቆ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝑔௝
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝𝜕𝛿
−
𝜕ଶ𝑈௝
𝜕𝑔௝ଶ
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝛿
ቇ 14 
and from equation (A2), 15 
𝜕ଶ𝑈௜
𝜕𝑔௜𝜕𝛿
= ൬−
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑔௜
𝛼ఓ𝑉ఓ൰ 𝛽𝑔ି௜ > 0 16 
As    ∂v
∂δ
= ∂
2μ
∂gi∂δ
= ∂
2v
∂gi∂δ
=0  17 
 18 
Similarly, డ
మ௎ೕ
డ௚ೕడఋ
= ൬− డ௩
డ௚ೕ
𝛼ఓ𝑉ఓ൰ 𝛽𝑔ି௝ > 0. It follows that 
డ௚೔
డఋ
> 0 because of strategic 19 
complementarity ( డ
మ௎೔
డ௚೔డ௚ೕ
> 0) and concavity (డ
మ௎ೕ
డ௚ೕ
మ < 0).  20 
Hence, the bigger the strategic complementarities (and thus strategic uncertainty) the stronger the 21 
incentives to adopt environment-friendly practices. 22 
                                                 
15 A similar result can be expected with respect to an increase in 𝛽, the marginal utility of 𝑔. 
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Appendix B: results of non-parametric tests 1 
We relied on the Wilcoxon rank-sum two-sample test to compare the choices of participants in the 2 
four risk settings (between-subject treatments). Results are presented in Table A. 3 
Table A: Results of Wilcoxon two samples tests, with no payment 
 ForeOnly BackOnly Fore&Back 
Benchmark 
z =  3.268 
Prob>|z|= 0.0011*** 
z =  3.742 
Prob>|z|= 0.0002*** 
z =  4.553 
Prob>|z|= 0.0000*** 
ForeOnly  
z =  -0.183 
Prob>|z|=0.8551- 
z =  1.813 
Prob>|z|=0.0698* 
BackOnly   
z =  2.140 
Prob>|z|=0.0324** 
The number of stars indicates the significance level : *** is significant at 1 %, ** is significant at 5 %, * is significant at 
10 %, - is not significant. 
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test (chi-squared = 41.771, prob = 0.0001): we can reject the hypothesis the 
four samples are from the same population. 
 4 
In order to analyze the impact of the incentive payment and the way it might influence it differently 5 
depending on the risk contexts, we rely on a Wilcoxon matched pair test to compare the choices of 6 
participants without and with incentive payment. Results are presented in Table B. 7 
 8 
Table B : Average number of hectares farmed with environment-friendly practices and results of 
Wilcoxon matched pair tests 
 
 Benchmark ForeOnly BackOnly Fore&Back 
No payment 
scenario 63 50 50 41 
Payment scenario 73 61 60 41 
difference z =  -4.461 
Prob>|z|=0.0000 
*** 
z =  -3.691 
Prob>|z|=0.0002 
*** 
z =  -3.488   
Prob>|z|=0.0005 
*** 
z =  -0.570   
Prob>|z|=0.5686 
- 
 9 
  10 
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Appendix C: instructions (translated from French) 1 
Economic study on agricultural practices 2 
Introduction 3 
Thank you for participating in this survey, which is part of a research project in economics and 4 
psychology at the University of Angers. This research is entirely funded by the University of Angers, 5 
and it is entirely independent of any political interest or the agricultural profession. 6 
Our aim is to increase understanding of farmers' motivations in various scenarios.  7 
The survey is divided into five parts and takes about 30 minutes to complete. 8 
Each part (from Part 1 to Part 4) consists of: 9 
- explanations 10 
- a comprehension test to check that you have fully understood the explanations 11 
- decisions to be taken. There is no right or wrong answer. We are just seeking to know more about 12 
your decision making. 13 
 14 
Why should you participate in this survey? 15 
Scientific research 16 
First, your answers will be useful to scientific research regarding agricultural policies. It is essential 17 
that studies that are independent of States, European institutions, and agricultural trade unions be 18 
conducted on this topic. 19 
 20 
Remuneration 21 
Second, as a token of our gratitude, you will receive within a couple of weeks a gift card valid in 22 
numerous brands. You can view the list of these brands on the « illicado » site. 23 
The exact amount of the gift card will depend upon your survey answers. You will earn points in 24 
each part of the survey, and these points will be converted into euros credited to the gift card, based 25 
on the following rate: 200 points = 1 euro. 26 
The gift card amount will be between 1,000 and 6,000 points (hence, between 5 and 30 euros). 27 
 28 
Privileged access to the results  29 
Finally, a synthesis of the findings will be emailed to you. 30 
What will the survey data be used for? 31 
The data collected in the survey will be used for scientific purposes only. No data will be given to the 32 
State or any other body external to the University. The survey results will be used for one or several 33 
scientific publications that will be made available to the general public on the Internet.  34 
The data will be anonymous: your name and address will be used only to send you the gift card; then, 35 
they will be erased from our database. 36 
Should you have any questions, please feel free to email us. You will receive an answer within 24 37 
hours, and you will then be able to return to the survey. 38 
The final deadline for your participation in the survey is May 10, 2017. After this date, the survey 39 
will no longer be available. 40 
  41 
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Part 1  1 
In Part 1, you have one decision only to take. 2 
You have 500 points. You may decide to keep these points or to invest them all or some of them. 3 
  4 
The investment we offer you is risky: there is a 50/50 chance that the project fails and a 50/50 chance 5 
that it succeeds. The computer will run a random draw to decide whether the project is successful or 6 
not. 7 
  8 
Should the computer draw "success", the points invested are multiplied by 2.5. Hence, you win the 9 
points non invested plus 2.5 times the points invested. 10 
  11 
Should the computer draw "fail", all the points invested are lost. Hence, your investment is deducted 12 
from your original number of points (i.e. 500 points). 13 
  14 
First example: 15 
If you decide to invest 400 out of the 500 points. 16 
If the computer draws "success", you win 500 - 400 + 2.5 x 400= 1,100 points 17 
If the computer draws "fail", you lose the points invested, and you are left with 100 points. 18 
  19 
Second example: 20 
If you decide to invest 100 out of the 500 points. 21 
If the computer draws "success", you win 500 - 100 + 2.5 x 100=650 points 22 
If the computer draws "fail", you lose the points invested, and you are left with 400 points. 23 
  24 
Remember: The points you win in Part 1 will be added to your total of points, then will be converted 25 
into euros credited to the gift card, based on the following rate: 200 points = 1 euro. 26 
 27 
Comprehension test: 28 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  29 
How much are 500 points worth?   30 
Please select one answer only: 31 
€0.50  32 
€2.50  33 
€5  34 
 35 
If you decide to invest 250 points, how many points will you receive? 36 
If the project fails, I will receive:   37 
Please select one answer only: 38 
0 point  39 
250 points  40 
875 points  41 
 42 
If the project succeeds, I will receive:   43 
Please select one answer only: 44 
0 point  45 
250 points  46 
875 points  47 
 48 
 49 
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Test answers: 1 
500 points are worth €2.50. 2 
If you invest 250 points and the project fails, you will receive 0 point. 3 
If the project succeeds, you will receive 875 points. 4 
 5 
Decision  6 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 1. 7 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again. 8 
Remember: 200 points = €1 9 
 10 
How much do you wish to invest? 11 
The total must be 500 points.   12 
How many points do you wish to invest?  13 
How many points do you wish to keep?   14 
 15 
How many points do you think the other survey participants will invest on average?   16 
Your answer must be 1,000 at the most. 17 
Enter an integer only in this field. 18 
Part 2  19 
In Part 2, you are partnered with another person whom you do not know. This person is randomly 20 
selected by the computer from among all the participants to the survey. At no time will you know 21 
who the person is, and the person will not know who you are either. 22 
  23 
You need to select the number of points you keep for yourself and the number of points you give to 24 
this other person. This person will do the same. 25 
  26 
Hence, you will receive the points you decided to keep for yourself and the points this other person 27 
decided to give you. 28 
  29 
Remember: The points you win in Part 2 will be added to your total of points, then will be converted 30 
into euros credited to the gift card, based on the following rate: 200 points = 1 euro. 31 
 32 
Comprehension test: 33 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  34 
 35 
If you decide as indicated in the first table and the other person decides as indicated in the second 36 
table, how many points are you going to receive? 37 
  38 
Your decision: 39 
You keep for yourself 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 
You give the other person 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 
          X         
  40 
The other person's decision: 41 
He/she keeps for 
himself/herself: 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 
He/she gives me 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 
38 
 
              X     
Please select one answer only: 1 
I will receive 500 points  2 
I will receive 700 points  3 
I will receive 900 points  4 
 5 
Answer: 6 
  7 
In this case, you will receive 700 points. 500 points you keep for yourself + 200 points the other 8 
person decided to give you. 9 
   10 
Decision  11 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 2. 12 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again 13 
Remember: 200 points = €1 14 
 15 
For each table, which distribution of points do you decide? 16 
  17 
Remember that you need to decide on various distributions of points between you and another 18 
person. You receive the points you decided to keep for yourself plus the points another person has 19 
given you. 20 
  21 
The computer draws a number between 1 and 6. This number corresponds to the decision used to 22 
calculate your points in Part 2. 23 
 24 
  25 
Decision 1 
You receive 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 
The other person receives 425 390 340 295 250 205 165 120 90 
  26 
Which distribution do you decide upon? (for yourself; for the other person) 27 
Please select one answer only  28 
 29 
Decision 2 
You receive 425 435 445 455 465 470 480 490 500 
The other person receives 75 80 120 140 165 185 205 230 250 
  30 
Which distribution do you decide upon? (for yourself; for the other person) 31 
Please select one answer only  32 
 33 
Decision 3 
You receive: 250 270 295 315 340 360 380 405 425 
The other person receives 500 490 480 470 465 455 445 435 425 
  34 
Which distribution do you decide upon? (for yourself; for the other person) 35 
Please select one answer only  36 
 37 
Decision 4 
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You receive 250 270 295 315 340 360 380 405 425 
The other person receives  500 445 395 340 290 235 180 130 75 
  1 
Which distribution do you decide upon? (for yourself; for the other person) 2 
Please select one answer only  3 
 4 
Decision 5 
You receive 500 470 440 405 375 345 315 280 250 
The other person receives 250 280 315 345 375 405 440 470 500 
  5 
Which distribution do you decide upon? (for yourself; for the other person) 6 
Please select one answer only  7 
 8 
Decision 6 
You receive 500 490 480 470 465 455 445 435 425 
The other person receives  250 270 295 315 340 360 380 405 425 
  9 
Which distribution do you decide upon? (for yourself; for the other person) 10 
Please select one answer only  11 
Part 3  12 
This survey part may appear to be rather complicated. Hence, take your time before responding 13 
because your gain will depend upon your decision. Remember: The points you win in Part 3 will be 14 
added to your total of points, then will be converted into euros credited to the gift card, based on the 15 
following rate: 200 points = 1 euro. 16 
You play the role of a farmer who has 80 hectares cultivated in large-scale crops.  17 
The computer will draw another participant in this survey to be your "neighbor". At no time will you 18 
know who the person is, and the person will not know who you are either. 19 
There are two possible crop systems: the orange one and the purple one. The purple system is more 20 
effective than the orange one to reduce the environmental impact of agricultural production.  21 
You need to select which crop system you wish to use per tract of 20 hectares. 22 
Treatment 1 23 
Your gain (in points) for Part 3 is determined as follows: 24 
Revenue:  25 
Your crops bring you a revenue of 15 points per hectare, regardless of the crop system put in place. 26 
The revenue per hectare remains the same. 27 
Observations carried out in the farms that have implemented the purple crop system show that the 28 
revenue is the same as that of the orange system. 29 
Production costs: 30 
40 
 
The production costs with the orange system are 4 points per hectare. 1 
The production costs with the purple system are 7 points per hectare. These costs are higher than 2 
those of the orange system because implementation requires more equipment or more work. 3 
Ecosystem services: 4 
Setting up the purple system contributes to the ecosystem services nature provides. 5 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor determines 6 
the quality of these services provided by nature. 7 
In other words, the purple system generates additional revenue when it is adopted collectively. 8 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor will bring 9 
you an additional gain (in points) that is equal to twice the cultivated surface. For instance, if both 10 
farmers use the purple system to cultivate half their surface, the additional gain is 2 x (40+40) =160 11 
points. 12 
 13 
Comprehension test: 14 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  15 
 16 
My number of points in Part 3 is determined by the crop system I decide to put in place (orange or 17 
purple).   18 
Please select one answer only: 19 
True  20 
False  21 
 22 
The purple system is less expensive for me if my neighbor also implements it.   23 
Please select one answer only: 24 
True  25 
False  26 
 27 
I will receive a revenue of 15 points per hectare regardless of the number of hectares I cultivate with 28 
the purple system.   29 
Please select one answer only: 30 
True  31 
False  32 
 33 
The sum of the number of hectares cultivated with the orange crop system and of the number of 34 
hectares cultivated with the purple crop system determines the additional gain related to the 35 
ecosystem services.   36 
Please select one answer only: 37 
True  38 
False  39 
 40 
Test answers: 41 
 The number of points you obtain in Part 3 is determined by the crop system you decide to set up 42 
(orange or purple).  43 
41 
 
The purple system is not less expensive for you if your neighbor also puts it in place. The cost of the 1 
purple system is the same, but you benefit from an additional gain related to the ecosystem services 2 
if your neighbor also puts it in place.  3 
 You will receive a revenue of 15 points per hectare regardless of the number of hectares you 4 
cultivate with the purple system. 5 
  6 
The sum of the number of hectares cultivated with the orange crop system and of the number of 7 
hectares cultivated with the purple crop system does not determine the additional gain related to the 8 
ecosystem services. What determines the additional gain related to the ecosystem services is the sum 9 
of the number of hectares cultivated with the purple crop system by you and your neighbor.  10 
 11 
Decision  12 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 3. 13 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again 14 
Remember: 200 points = €1 15 
 16 
You have no calculations to make. These tables indicate your gain depending upon your decision and 17 
the total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system. To obtain your total gain, you need to 18 
add your individual gain and the additional gain related to the ecosystem services.  19 
 20 
 Your farming operation: number of hectares with the purple crop system 
 0 
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Individual 
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 21 
 22 
 Total  number of hectares (you + your neighbor) with the purple crop 
system 
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 23 
Your decision (orange system hectares; purple system hectares) 24 
  25 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
 26 
Please select one answer only  27 
42 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
What do you believe will be your neighbor's decision? (orange system hectares; purple system 4 
hectares) 5 
  6 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
  7 
Please select one answer only  8 
Treatment 2 9 
Your gain (in points) for Part 3 is determined as follows: 10 
  11 
Revenue:  12 
Your crops bring you a revenue of 15 points per hectare, regardless of the crop system put in place. 13 
Observations carried out in the farms that have implemented the purple crop system show that the 14 
revenue is the same as that of the orange system. 15 
  16 
Production costs: 17 
The orange system production cost is fixed, known, and equal to 4 points per hectare. 18 
In contrast, the purple system production cost is not known in advance. It may increase through 19 
adverse events such as unpredictable weather conditions or the onset of diseases.  20 
The computer will randomly determine whether there is an adverse event (a 50/50 chance). The 21 
production cost will thus depend upon this random draw. If an adverse event occurs, the cost of the 22 
purple system is 9 points per hectare. If no adverse event occurs, the cost of the purple system is 5 23 
points per hectare. 24 
  25 
Ecosystem services: 26 
Setting up the purple system contributes to the ecosystem services nature provides. 27 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor determines 28 
the quality of these services provided by nature. 29 
In other words, the purple system generates additional revenue when it is adopted collectively. 30 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor will bring 31 
you an additional gain (in points) that is equal to twice the cultivated surface. For instance, if both 32 
farmers use the purple system to cultivate half their surface, the additional gain is 2 x (40+40) =160 33 
points. 34 
 35 
Comprehension test: 36 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  37 
 38 
My number of points in Part 3 is determined by the crop system I decide to put in place (orange or 39 
purple).   40 
Please select one answer only: 41 
True  42 
False  43 
 44 
The purple system is less expensive for me if my neighbor also implements it.   45 
Please select one answer only: 46 
True  47 
43 
 
False  1 
I will receive a revenue of 15 points per hectare regardless of the number of hectares I cultivate with 2 
the purple system.   3 
Please select one answer only: 4 
True  5 
False  6 
 7 
The sum of the number of hectares cultivated with the orange crop system and of the number of 8 
hectares cultivated with the purple crop system determines the additional gain related to the 9 
ecosystem services.   10 
Please select one answer only: 11 
True  12 
False  13 
 14 
Test answers: 15 
  16 
The number of points you obtain in Part 3 is determined by the crop system you decide to set up 17 
(orange or purple). 18 
  19 
The purple system is not less expensive for you if your neighbor also puts it in place. The cost of the 20 
purple system is the same, but you benefit from an additional gain related to the ecosystem services 21 
if your neighbor also puts it in place. 22 
  23 
You will receive a revenue of 15 points per hectare regardless of the number of hectares you 24 
cultivate with the purple system. 25 
  26 
The sum of the number of hectares cultivated with the orange crop system and of the number of 27 
hectares cultivated with the purple crop system does not determine the additional gain related to the 28 
ecosystem services. What determines the additional gain related to the ecosystem services is the sum 29 
of the number of hectares cultivated with the purple crop system by you and your neighbor.  30 
 31 
Decision  32 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 3. 33 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again 34 
Remember: 200 points = €1 35 
 36 
You have no calculations to make. These tables indicate your gain depending upon your decision and 37 
the total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system. To obtain your total gain, you need to 38 
add your individual gain and the additional gain related to the ecosystem services. 39 
 40 
 41 
  Your farming operation: number of hectares with 
the purple crop system 
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Individual gain  (in 
points) 
No adverse event 
Cost of the purple 
system: 5 pts/ha 
880 860 840 820 800 
44 
 
Adverse event: 
Cost of the purple 
system: 9 pts/ha 
880 780 680 580 480 
 1 
  Total  number of hectares (you + your neighbor) with the purple crop 
system 
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 2 
Your decision (orange system hectares; purple system hectares) 3 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
 Please select one answer only  4 
 5 
What do you believe will be your neighbor's decision? (orange system hectares; purple system 6 
hectares) 7 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
Please select one answer only  8 
 9 
Treatment 3 10 
Your gain (in points) for Part 3 is determined as follows: 11 
  12 
Revenue:  13 
Your crops bring you the same revenue per hectare, regardless of the crop system put in place. 14 
Observations carried out in the farms that have implemented the purple crop system show that the 15 
revenue is the same as that of the orange system. 16 
However, the revenue is not known in advance because it can decrease through adverse events that 17 
reduce yield and/or prices on the agricultural markets.  18 
The computer will randomly determine whether there is an adverse event (a 50/50 chance). The 19 
revenue per hectare will thus depend upon this draw. If an adverse event occurs, the revenue per 20 
hectare is 10 points per hectare. If no adverse event occurs, the revenue per hectare is 20 points per 21 
hectare. 22 
  23 
Production costs: 24 
The production costs with the orange system are 4 points per hectare. 25 
The production costs with the purple system are 7 points per hectare. These costs are higher than 26 
those of the orange system because implementation requires more equipment or more work. 27 
  28 
45 
 
Ecosystem services: 1 
Setting up the purple system contributes to the ecosystem services nature provides. 2 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor determines 3 
the quality of these services provided by nature. 4 
In other words, the purple system generates additional revenue when it is adopted collectively. 5 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor will bring 6 
you an additional gain (in points) that is equal to twice the cultivated surface. For instance, if both 7 
farmers use the purple system to cultivate half their surface, the additional gain is 2 x (40+40) =160 8 
points. 9 
 10 
Comprehension test: 11 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  12 
 13 
My number of points in Part 3 is determined by the crop system I decide to put in place (orange or 14 
purple).   15 
Please select one answer only: 16 
True  17 
False  18 
 19 
The purple system is less expensive for me if my neighbor also implements it.   20 
Please select one answer only: 21 
True  22 
False  23 
 24 
My revenue depends only upon the number of hectares cultivated with the purple system.  25 
Please select one answer only: 26 
True  27 
False  28 
 29 
The sum of the number of hectares cultivated with the orange crop system and of the number of 30 
hectares cultivated with the purple crop system determines the additional gain related to the 31 
ecosystem services.  32 
Please select one answer only: 33 
True  34 
False  35 
 36 
Test answers: 37 
  38 
The number of points you obtain in Part 3 is determined by the crop system you decide to set up 39 
(orange or purple). 40 
  41 
The purple system is not less expensive for you if your neighbor also puts it in place. The cost of the 42 
purple system is the same, but you benefit from an additional gain related to the ecosystem services 43 
if your neighbor also puts it in place. 44 
  45 
Your revenue does not depend only upon the number of hectares cultivated with the purple system 46 
since it can decrease through adverse events that reduce yield and/or prices on the agricultural 47 
markets.  48 
  49 
46 
 
The sum of the number of hectares cultivated with the orange crop system and of the number of 1 
hectares cultivated with the purple crop system does not determine the additional gain related to the 2 
ecosystem services. What determines the additional gain related to the ecosystem services is the sum 3 
of the number of hectares cultivated with the purple crop system by you and your neighbor. 4 
 5 
Decision  6 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 3. 7 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again 8 
Remember: 200 points = €1 9 
 10 
You have no calculations to make. These tables indicate your gain depending upon your decision and 11 
the total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system. To obtain your total gain, you need to 12 
add your individual gain and the additional gain related to the ecosystem services. 13 
 14 
 15 
  Your farming operation: number of hectares with the 
purple crop system 
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 16 
 17 
 Total  number of hectares (you + your neighbor) with the purple crop 
system 
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 18 
Your decision (orange system hectares; purple system hectares) 19 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
Please select one answer only  20 
 21 
47 
 
What do you believe will be your neighbor's decision? (orange system hectares; purple system 1 
hectares) 2 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
Please select one answer only  3 
  4 
48 
 
Treatment 4 1 
Your gain (in points) for Part 3 is determined as follows: 2 
  3 
Revenue:  4 
Your crops bring you the same revenue per hectare, regardless of the crop system put in place. 5 
Observations carried out in the farms that have implemented the purple crop system show that the 6 
revenue is the same as that of the orange system. 7 
However, the revenue is not known in advance because it can decrease through adverse events that 8 
reduce yield and/or prices on the agricultural markets. 9 
The computer will randomly determine whether there is an adverse event (a 50/50 chance). The 10 
revenue per hectare will thus depend upon this draw. If an adverse event occurs, the revenue per 11 
hectare is 10 points per hectare. If no adverse event occurs, the revenue per hectare is 20 points per 12 
hectare. 13 
 14 
Production costs: 15 
The orange system production cost is fixed, known, and equal to 4 points per hectare. 16 
In contrast, the purple system production cost is not known in advance. It may increase through 17 
adverse events such as unpredictable weather conditions or the onset of diseases. 18 
The computer will randomly determine whether there is an adverse event that affects the production 19 
costs with the purple system occurs or not (a 50/50 chance). The production cost will thus depend 20 
upon this random draw. If an adverse event occurs, the cost of the purple system is 9 points per 21 
hectare. If no adverse event occurs, the cost of the purple system is 5 points per hectare. 22 
  23 
Ecosystem services: 24 
Setting up the purple system contributes to the ecosystem services nature provides. 25 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor determines 26 
the quality of these services provided by nature. 27 
In other words, the purple system generates additional revenue when it is adopted collectively. 28 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor will bring 29 
you an additional gain (in points) that is equal to twice the cultivated surface. For instance, if both 30 
farmers use the purple system to cultivate half their surface, the additional gain is 2 x (40+40) =160 31 
points. 32 
 33 
Comprehension test: 34 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  35 
 36 
My number of points in Part 3 is determined by the crop system I decide to put in place (orange or 37 
purple).   38 
Please select one answer only: 39 
True  40 
False  41 
 42 
The purple system is less expensive for me if my neighbor also implements it.   43 
Please select one answer only: 44 
True  45 
False  46 
 47 
My revenue depends only upon the number of hectares cultivated with the purple system.   48 
Please select one answer only: 49 
49 
 
True / False  1 
 2 
The sum of the number of hectares cultivated with the orange crop system and of the number of 3 
hectares cultivated with the purple crop system determines the additional gain related to the 4 
ecosystem services.   5 
Please select one answer only: 6 
True / False  7 
 8 
Test answers: 9 
 The number of points you obtain in Part 3 is determined by the crop system you decide to set up 10 
(orange or purple). 11 
  12 
The purple system is not less expensive for you if your neighbor also puts it in place. The cost of the 13 
purple system is the same, but you benefit from an additional gain related to the ecosystem services 14 
if your neighbor also puts it in place. 15 
  16 
Your revenue does not depend only upon the number of hectares cultivated with the purple system 17 
since it can decrease through adverse events that reduce yield and/or prices on the agricultural 18 
markets. 19 
  20 
The sum of the number of hectares cultivated with the orange crop system and of the number of 21 
hectares cultivated with the purple crop system does not determine the additional gain related to the 22 
ecosystem services. What determines the additional gain related to the ecosystem services is the sum 23 
of the number of hectares cultivated with the purple crop system by you and your neighbor.  24 
 25 
Decision  26 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 3. 27 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again 28 
Remember: 200 points = €1 29 
 30 
You have no calculations to make. These tables indicate your gain depending upon your decision and 31 
the total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system. To obtain your total gain, you need to 32 
add your individual gain and the additional gain related to the ecosystem services. 33 
 34 
  Your farming operation: number of 
hectares with the purple crop system 
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Two adverse events 480 380 280 180 80 
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Low revenue: 10 pts/ha 
High cost of the purple system: 9 pts/ha 
 1 
 Total  number of hectares (you + your neighbor) with the purple crop 
system 
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Additional 
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 2 
Your decision (orange system hectares; purple system hectares)  3 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
 Please select one answer only  4 
 5 
What do you believe will be your neighbor's decision? (orange system hectares; purple system 6 
hectares) 7 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
Please select one answer only 8 
5 Part 4  9 
Treatment 1 10 
This part is similar to the previous one. The only difference is that a subsidy has been set up for those 11 
farmers who undertake to set up the purple crop system, 12 
Remember: The points you win in Part 4 will be added to your total of points, then will be converted 13 
into euros credited to the gift card, based on the following rate: 200 points = 1 euro. 14 
 15 
Your gain (in points) for Part 4 is determined as follows: 16 
Revenue, production costs, and the gain related to the ecosystem services are identical to the 17 
preceding part. 18 
  19 
Revenue: 20 
Your crops bring you a revenue of 15 points per hectare, regardless of the crop system put in place. 21 
Observations carried out in the farms that have implemented the purple crop system show that the 22 
revenue is the same as that of the orange system. 23 
  24 
Production costs: 25 
The production costs with the orange system are 4 points per hectare. 26 
The production costs with the purple system are 7 points per hectare. These costs are higher than 27 
those of the orange system because implementation requires more equipment or more work. 28 
51 
 
  1 
 2 
 3 
Ecosystem services: 4 
Setting up the purple system contributes to the ecosystem services nature provides. 5 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor determines 6 
the quality of these services provided by nature. 7 
In other words, the purple system generates additional revenue when it is adopted collectively. 8 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor will bring 9 
you an additional gain (in points) that is equal to twice the cultivated surface. For instance, if both 10 
farmers use the purple system to cultivate half their surface, the additional gain is 2 x (40+40) =160 11 
points. 12 
 13 
Subsidy: 14 
The subsidy brings you 2 additional points per each hectare you choose to cultivate with the 15 
purple crop system. 16 
 17 
Comprehension test: 18 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  19 
 20 
I receive the subsidy only if I cultivate all 80 hectares with the purple system.   21 
Please select one answer only: 22 
True / False  23 
 24 
Because of the subsidy, I have the same gain regardless of the type of system I choose.   25 
Please select one answer only: 26 
True / False  27 
 28 
Results: 29 
  30 
You do not need to cultivate the 80 hectares with the purple system to receive the subsidy. The 31 
subsidy amounts to 2 points for each hectare cultivated with the purple crop system. 32 
  33 
The gain varies according to the type of system because the production costs are different and the 34 
subsidy is paid only for the purple system. The additional gain related to the ecosystem services 35 
depends upon your choice but also that of your neighbor.  36 
 37 
Decision  38 
 39 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 4. 40 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again 41 
 42 
You have no calculations to make. These tables indicate your gain depending upon your decision and 43 
the total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system. To obtain your total gain, you need to 44 
add your individual gain and the additional gain related to the ecosystem services.  Remember: 200 45 
points = €1 46 
 47 
 48 
 49 
 50 
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 3 
 Your farming operation: number of hectares with the purple crop system 
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 4 
 Total number of hectares (you + your neighbor) with the purple crop 
system 
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Additional 
gain related to 
the ecosystem 
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 5 
Your decision (orange system hectares; purple system hectares)  6 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
 Please select one answer only 7 
 8 
What do you believe will be your neighbor's decision ? (orange system hectares; purple system 9 
hectares) 10 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
 Please select one answer only 11 
Treatment 2 12 
This part is similar to the preceding one. The only difference is that a subsidy has been set up for 13 
those farmers who undertake to set up the purple crop system. 14 
Remember: The points you win in Part 4 will be added to your total of points, then will be converted 15 
into euros credited to the gift card, based on the following rate: 200 points = 1 euro. 16 
 17 
Your gain (in points) for Part 4 is determined as follows: 18 
Revenue, production costs, and ecosystem services are the same as in the preceding part. 19 
  20 
Revenue: 21 
Your crops bring you a revenue of 15 points per hectare, regardless of the crop system put in place. 22 
53 
 
Observations carried out in the farms that have implemented the purple crop system show that the 1 
revenue is the same as that of the orange system. 2 
  3 
Production costs: 4 
The orange system production cost is fixed, known, and equal to 4 points per hectare. 5 
In contrast, the purple system production cost is not known in advance. It may increase through 6 
adverse events such as unpredictable weather conditions or the onset of diseases. 7 
The computer will randomly determine whether there is an adverse event (a 50/50 chance). The 8 
production cost will thus depend upon this random draw. If an adverse event occurs, the cost of the 9 
purple system is 9 points per hectare. If no adverse event occurs, the cost of the purple system is 5 10 
points per hectare. 11 
  12 
Ecosystem services: 13 
Setting up the purple system contributes to the ecosystem services nature provides. 14 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor determines 15 
the quality of these services provided by nature. 16 
In other words, the purple system generates additional revenue when it is adopted collectively. 17 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor will bring 18 
you an additional gain (in points) that is equal to twice the cultivated surface. For instance, if both 19 
farmers use the purple system to cultivate half their surface, the additional gain is 2 x (40+40) =160 20 
points. 21 
  22 
Subsidy: 23 
The subsidy brings you 2 additional points per each hectare you choose to cultivate with the 24 
purple crop system. 25 
 26 
Comprehension test: 27 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  28 
 29 
I receive the subsidy only if I cultivate all 80 hectares with the purple system.   30 
Please select one answer only: 31 
True / False  32 
 33 
Because of the subsidy, I have the same gain regardless of the type of system I choose.   34 
Please select one answer only: 35 
True / False  36 
 37 
Results: 38 
 You do not need to cultivate the 80 hectares with the purple system to receive the subsidy. The 39 
subsidy amounts to 2 points for each hectare cultivated with the purple crop system. 40 
  41 
The gain varies according to the type of system because the production costs are different and the 42 
subsidy is paid only for the purple system. The additional gain related to the ecosystem services 43 
depends upon your choice but also that of your neighbor.  44 
 45 
 46 
Decision  47 
 48 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 4. 49 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again 50 
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 1 
You have no calculations to make. These tables indicate your gain depending upon your decision and 2 
the total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system. To obtain your total gain, you need to 3 
add your individual gain and the additional gain related to the ecosystem services.  Remember: 200 4 
points = €1 5 
 6 
  Your farming operation: number of hectares with 
the purple crop system 
  0 
▒ ▒ ▒ 
▒ 
20 
█ ▒ ▒ 
▒ 
40 
█ █ ▒ 
▒ 
60 
█ █ █ 
▒ 
80 
█ █ █ 
█ 
 
Individual gain  (in 
points) 
No adverse event 
Cost of the purple 
system: 5 pts/ha 
880 900 920 940 960 
Adverse event: 
Cost of the purple 
system: 9 pts/ha 
880 820 760 700 640 
 7 
 8 
 Total  number of hectares (you + your neighbor) with the purple crop 
system 
 0 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
20 
█ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
40 
█ █ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
60 
█ █ 
█ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
80 
█ █ 
█ █ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
100 
█ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
120 
█ █ 
▒ ▒ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
140 
█ █ 
█ ▒ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
160 
█ █ █ 
█ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
 
Additional 
gain related to 
the ecosystem 
services (in 
points) 
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 
 9 
Your decision (orange system hectares; purple system hectares)  10 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
 Please select one answer only  11 
 12 
What do you believe will be your neighbor's decision? (orange system hectares; purple system 13 
hectares) 14 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
 Please select one answer only 15 
 Treatment 3 16 
This part is similar to the preceding one.  The only difference is that a subsidy has been set up for 17 
those farmers who undertake to set up the purple crop system. 18 
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Remember: The points you win in Part 4 will be added to your total of points, then will be converted 1 
into euros credited to the gift card, based on the following rate: 200 points = 1 euro. 2 
 3 
Your gain (in points) for Part 3 is determined as follows: 4 
Revenue, production costs, and ecosystem services are the same as in the preceding part. 5 
  6 
 7 
Revenue: 8 
Your crops bring you the same revenue per hectare, regardless of the crop system put in place. 9 
Observations carried out in the farms that have implemented the purple crop system show that the 10 
revenue is the same as that of the orange system. 11 
However, the revenue is not known in advance because it can decrease through adverse events that 12 
reduce yield and/or prices on the agricultural markets. 13 
The computer will randomly determine whether there is an adverse event (a 50/50 chance). The 14 
revenue per hectare will thus depend upon this draw. If an adverse event occurs, the revenue per 15 
hectare is 10 points per hectare. If no adverse event occurs, the revenue per hectare is 20 points per 16 
hectare. 17 
 18 
Production costs: 19 
The production costs with the orange system are 4 points per hectare. 20 
The production costs with the purple system are 7 points per hectare. These costs are higher than 21 
those of the orange system because implementation requires more equipment or more work. 22 
  23 
Ecosystem services: 24 
Setting up the purple system contributes to the ecosystem services nature provides. 25 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor determines 26 
the quality of these services provided by nature. 27 
In other words, the purple system generates additional revenue when it is adopted collectively. 28 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor will bring 29 
you an additional gain (in points) that is equal to twice the cultivated surface. For instance, if both 30 
farmers use the purple system to cultivate half their surface, the additional gain is 2 x (40+40) =160 31 
points. 32 
  33 
Subsidy : 34 
The subsidy brings you 2 additional points per each hectare you choose to cultivate with the 35 
purple crop system. 36 
 37 
Comprehension test: 38 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  39 
 40 
I receive the subsidy only if I cultivate all 80 hectares with the purple system.   41 
Please select one answer only: 42 
True / False  43 
 44 
Because of the subsidy, I have the same gain regardless of the type of system I choose. 45 
 Please select one answer only: 46 
   True / False  47 
 48 
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Results:  1 
  2 
I do not need to cultivate the 80 hectares with the purple system to receive the subsidy. The subsidy 3 
amounts to 2 points for each hectare cultivated with the purple crop system. 4 
  5 
The gain varies according to the type of system because the production costs are different and the 6 
subsidy is paid only for the purple system. The additional gain related to the ecosystem services 7 
depends upon your choice but also that of your neighbor.  8 
 9 
Decision  10 
 11 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 4. 12 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again 13 
 14 
You have no calculations to make. These tables indicate your gain depending upon your decision and 15 
the total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system. To obtain your total gain, you need to 16 
add your individual gain and the additional gain related to the ecosystem services.  Remember: 200 17 
points = €1 18 
 19 
  Your farming operation: number of hectares with the 
purple crop system 
  0 
▒ ▒ ▒ ▒ 
20 
█ ▒ ▒ ▒ 
40 
█ █ ▒ ▒ 
60 
█ █ █ ▒ 
80 
█ █ █ █ 
 
Individual gain  (in 
points) 
No adverse 
event 
Revenue: 20 
pts/ha 
1280 1260 1240 1220 1200 
Adverse event: 
Revenue: 10 
pts/ha 
480 460 440 420 400 
 20 
 21 
 Total  number of hectares (you + your neighbor) with the purple crop 
system 
 0 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
20 
█ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
40 
█ █ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
60 
█ █ 
█ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
80 
█ █ 
█ █ 
▒ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
100 
█ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
120 
█ █ 
▒ ▒ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
140 
█ █ 
█ ▒ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
160 
█ █ █ 
█ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
 
Additional 
gain related to 
the ecosystem 
services (in 
points) 
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 
 22 
Your decision (orange system hectares; purple system hectares)  23 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
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Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
 Please select one answer only  1 
 2 
What do you believe will be your neighbor's decision? (orange system hectares; purple system 3 
hectares) 4 
Hectares with the orange crop system  0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
 Please select one answer only 5 
Treatment 4  6 
This part is similar to the preceding one. The only difference is that a subsidy has been set up for 7 
those farmers who undertake to set up the purple crop system. 8 
Remember: The points you win in Part 1 will be added to your total of points, then will be converted 9 
into euros credited to the gift card, based on the following rate: 200 points = 1 euro. 10 
 11 
Your gain (in points) for Part 4 is determined as follows: 12 
Revenue, production costs, and ecosystem services are the same as in the preceding part. 13 
  14 
Revenue: 15 
Your crops bring you the same revenue per hectare, regardless of the crop system put in place. 16 
Observations carried out in the farms that have implemented the purple crop system show that the 17 
revenue is the same as that of the orange system. 18 
However, the revenue is not known in advance because it can decrease through adverse events that 19 
reduce yield and/or prices on the agricultural markets. 20 
The computer will randomly determine whether there is an adverse event (a 50/50 chance). The 21 
revenue per hectare will thus depend upon this draw. If an adverse event occurs, the revenue per 22 
hectare is 10 points per hectare. If no adverse event occurs, the revenue per hectare is 20 points per 23 
hectare. 24 
 25 
Production costs: 26 
The orange system production cost is fixed, known, and equal to 4 points per hectare. 27 
In contrast, the purple system production cost is not known in advance. It may increase through 28 
adverse events such as unpredictable weather conditions or the onset of diseases.   29 
The computer will randomly determine whether there is an adverse event that affects the production 30 
costs with the purple system occurs or not  (a 50/50 chance). The production cost will thus depend 31 
upon this random draw. If an adverse event occurs, the cost of the purple system is 9 points per 32 
hectare.  If no adverse event occurs, the cost of the purple system is 5 points per hectare.  33 
  34 
Ecosystem services: 35 
Setting up the purple system contributes to the ecosystem services nature provides. 36 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor determines 37 
the quality of these services provided by nature. 38 
In other words, the purple system generates additional revenue when it is adopted collectively. 39 
The total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system by you and your neighbor will bring 40 
you an additional gain (in points) that is equal to twice the cultivated surface. For instance, if both 41 
farmers use the purple system to cultivate half their surface, the additional gain is 2 x (40+40) =160 42 
points. 43 
  44 
Subsidy : 45 
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The subsidy brings you 2 additional points per each hectare you choose to cultivate with the 1 
purple crop system. 2 
 3 
Comprehension test: 4 
Please answer the following quiz to check you have understood the instructions.  5 
 6 
I receive the subsidy only if I cultivate all 80 hectares with the purple system.   7 
Please select one answer only: 8 
True / False  9 
Because of the subsidy, I have the same gain regardless of the type of system I choose. 10 
 Please select one answer only: 11 
True / False  12 
 13 
Results: 14 
  15 
I do not need to cultivate the 80 hectares with the purple system to receive the subsidy. The subsidy 16 
amounts to 2 points for each hectare cultivated with the purple crop system. 17 
  18 
The gain varies according to the type of system because the production costs are different and the 19 
subsidy is paid only for the purple system. The additional gain related to the ecosystem services 20 
depends upon your choice but also that of your neighbor. 21 
 Decision  22 
 23 
You are now able to make a decision for Part 4. 24 
You can click on "Previous" to read the explanations again 25 
 26 
You have no calculations to make. These tables indicate your gain depending upon your decision and 27 
the total number of hectares cultivated with the purple system. To obtain your total gain, you need to 28 
add your individual gain and the additional gain related to the ecosystem services.  Remember: 200 29 
points = €1 30 
 31 
  Your farming operation: number of 
hectares with the purple crop system 
  0 
▒ ▒ ▒ 
▒ 
20 
█ ▒ 
▒ ▒ 
40 
█ █ 
▒ ▒ 
60 
█ █ 
█ ▒ 
80 
█ █ 
█ █ 
 
Individual gain  (in 
points) 
No adverse event: 
High revenue: 20 pts/ha 
Low cost of the purple system: 5 
pts/ha 
1280 1300 1320 1340 1360 
An adverse event: 
High revenue: 20 pts/ha 
High cost of the purple system : 9 
pts/ha 
1280 1220 1160 1100 1040 
An adverse event: 
Low revenue: 10 pts/ha 
Low cost of the purple system: 5 
pts/ha 
480 500 520 540 560 
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Two adverse events 
Low revenue: 10 pts/ha 
High cost of the purple system: 9 
pts/ha 
480 420 360 300 240 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 Total  number of hectares (you + your neighbor) with the purple crop 
system 
 0 
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▒ ▒ 
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120 
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▒ ▒ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
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█ ▒ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
160 
█ █ █ 
█ 
█ █ 
█ █ 
 
Additional 
gain related to 
the ecosystem 
services (in 
points). 
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 
 7 
Your decision (orange system hectares; purple system hectares)  8 
Hectares cultivated with the orange crop system   0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares cultivated with the purple crop system  80 60 40 20 0 
 Please select one answer only  9 
 10 
What do you believe will be your neighbor's decision? (orange system hectares; purple system 11 
hectares) 12 
Hectares cultivated with the orange crop system   0 20 40 60 80 
Hectares cultivated with the purple crop system 80 60 40 20 0 
Please select one answer only  13 
6 Part 5 14 
Finally, we would like to have more information about you.  15 
Gender   16 
Please select one answer only: 17 
Masculine  18 
Feminine  19 
 20 
Year of birth   21 
Only numbers may be entered in this field. 22 
  23 
Are there any farmers in your family (father, mother, brother, sister, uncle, aunt)?   24 
Please select one answer only: 25 
Yes / No  26 
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 1 
How many days per year do you spend on a farm?   2 
Please select one answer only: 3 
More than 60 days a year  4 
Between 31 and 60 days a year  5 
Between 5 and 30 days a year  6 
Less than 5 days a year  7 
 8 
We would like to know what you think about setting up a crop system similar to the purple system 9 
that improves the environmental impact of agricultural production. 10 
Imagine that you are a farmer.  11 
 12 
What would prevent you from testing such a system on your farm? Give the main reason. 13 
 Please select one answer only: 14 
I fear reduced crop yields, hence reduced income  15 
This means acquiring additional information and skills  16 
I would like to sell my production at a higher price specifying that its environmental impact is 17 
reduced, but I fear I may not find markets.  18 
It requires excessive investments.  19 
None of the above  20 
 21 
In contrast, what would help you adopt such a system? Give the main reason. 22 
 Please select one answer only: 23 
Technical assistance  24 
Financial assistance to invest in the necessary equipment or training  25 
Financial assistance to take out insurance to cover a drop in income  26 
Higher subsidies to make up for the loss of earnings  27 
Joining a group of farmers who collectively undertake this venture  28 
None of the above  29 
 30 
Do you think that it is the responsibility of farmers to protect the environment?   31 
Please select one answer only: 32 
strongly disagree  33 
tend to disagree  34 
tend to agree  35 
strongly agree  36 
 37 
Do you think that the impact of agricultural practices on the environment is rather negative or 38 
positive?   39 
Please select one answer only: 40 
very negative  41 
rather negative  42 
rather positive  43 
very positive  44 
 45 
Are you considering becoming a farmer?   46 
Please select one answer only: 47 
Yes, as soon as I've finished school  48 
Yes, within the next 10 years  49 
Never  50 
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I don't know  1 
 2 
What would be the core farming activity?   3 
Answer this question only if the following conditions apply: The answer was 'Yes, as soon as I've 4 
finished school' or 'Yes, within the next 10 years' to the question Are you considering becoming a 5 
farmer?  6 
Please select one answer only: 7 
Cattle for milk only  8 
Cattle for meat and a mix milk-meat  9 
Intensive farming (e.g. pigs, poultry)  10 
Field crops  11 
Market gardening, horticulture and fruit  12 
Viticulture  13 
Other productions  14 
 15 
Do you think yours will be a certified organic farm?   16 
Please select one answer only: 17 
Yes / No  18 
 19 
Do you think you could join a group of farmers (e.g. CUMA, GDA, CIVAM, GAEC, cooperative) 20 
outside an agricultural union? 21 
Please select one answer only: 22 
Yes / No  23 
 24 
We cannot tell you your gain immediately because it depends upon the decisions made by another 25 
participant and random draws. Once we have the answers given by the participant you were 26 
partnered with by random draw, you will receive an email recapping your decisions and your gain 27 
for each part, and the final amount that will be credited to your gift card.  28 
 29 
Do you wish to receive your gift card?   30 
Please select one answer only: 31 
Yes / No  32 
 33 
Do you wish to receive the survey results by email?   34 
Please select one answer only: 35 
Yes / No  36 
 37 
Do you wish to take part in other surveys of this type that might be set up by the University of 38 
Angers?   39 
Please select one answer only: 40 
Yes / No  41 
 42 
Surname:   43 
First name:   44 
Address:  45 
Telephone (optional): 46 
Email address: 47 
 48 
The survey is finished. Thank you for your answers. 49 
We are available to answer any question or comment by email.  50 
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